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Summary 
In this study transaction costs of the EU ETS in the Netherlands in 2016 and its influence on the 
trading tendency of firms under the EU ETS are investigated. This study specifically focuses on the 
presence of variable transaction costs by testing the effect of firm size on the transaction costs per 
ton of CO2 emitted. By means of a survey, 39 firms (representing 70 of the 470 installations in the 
Netherlands) evaluated uncertainties, trading tendency and four categories of transactions costs 
(monitoring, reporting and verification; free allocation; trading; abatement). The study reveals that 
variable transaction costs exist, but have not affected trading tendency. Through evaluation of 
results with branch organizations it is concluded that variable costs will become more troublesome 
as these branch organizations expect the burden of the EU ETS to increase in the upcoming years. I 
therefore recommend simplifying MRV obligations and addressing trading capabilities of smaller 
firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (hereafter: EU ETS) celebrates its 12th birthday in 
2017. The EU ETS was established in 2005 to fight global warming and reach the goals of the Kyoto 
Protocol: reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions EU-wide by 20% in 2020 and by 80-95% in 
2050 when compared to 1990 levels (European Commission 2017a). Reducing GHG emissions is 
known as a so-called ‘collective action problem’, since ‘environment’ is a common good which 
cannot be grasped and controlled easily. However, the EU ETS is based on the system of ‘cap and 
trade’ which has been proven to be a successful and cost-efficient form of economic regulation in 
reaching GHG emissions reduction (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 2).  
In the system of ‘cap and trade’, polluting firms become part of a market of demand and supply of 
allowances. A cap is set to limit the total allowed tons of CO2 emitted by each firm, creating scarcity. 
By lowering the cap, and accordingly the amount of allowances available over time, scarcity grows. 
This increases the burden of buying allowances which should induce CO2 abatement. The market 
participants are able to trade their allowances (European Union Allowances: EUAs), enabling those 
who need more carbon allowances to buy additional EUAs and prevent exceeding the overall limit. 
The costs of buying carbon allowances should induce market participants to cut emissions by either 
developing their own technology and innovative production methods, or by simply reducing 
production levels (PBL 2013, 13). In the United States the use of cap and trade in e.g. the Acid Rain 
Program led to a successful reduction of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. Moreover, due to the market 
efficiency an estimated USD 1 billion was saved in comparison to alternative policies based on 
command and control (Calel 2013, 110). Consequently, greenhouse gas emitting EU firms even 
lobbied for the use of cap and trade in achieving the goals of the Kyoto Protocol (Calel 2013, 111).  
However, in reality the effect and efficiency of EU ETS has shown to be much more nuanced. The 
introduction of such uniform regulation into substantially varying national economies and sectors has 
led to a rocky start of the EU ETS. Since its establishment in 2005, the EU ETS experienced an 
overallocation of EUAs, plummeting EUA prices, and pertinent price volatility affecting its overall 
effectivity. Key factors suggested to cause price volatility were economic shocks such as the 
economic recession, conflicting environmental policies, national subsidies and most importantly: 
overall market immaturity (Betz and Sato 2006, 357).  
1.1 Research question 
The introduction of the EU ETS and its strengths and weaknesses has required firms under the EU ETS 
to rethink their abatement strategies, developing and acquiring new competencies and knowledge 
into their organization in order to comply to the new regulation (Engels 2009, 488). However, 
according to the theory of transaction costs by Coase, the uncertainties caused by incomplete 
institutional structures, design changes and volatile prices may have led to high costs. Moreover, due 
to the heterogeneity of EU ETS participants, variable transaction costs may have disproportionately 
burdened smaller firms (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 190). For example, small firms in e.g. the 
manufacturing industry may experience higher transaction costs per ton CO2 as their inhouse 
capabilities and knowledge lack in comparison to large electricity firms. This harms the EU ETS’ main 
principle of ‘the polluter pays’. This may lead to small firms reducing risk of noncompliance by 
emitting less and abating more CO2, whereas large firms experience less burden and have a higher 
trading tendency (Heindl 2012, 13). Furthermore, continued existence of variable transaction costs 
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will impede the development of a liquid market, competition and general equity of the EU ETS which 
might finally even result in a market failure (Matisof 2010, 3). Hence, the understanding and 
addressing of transaction costs in the EU ETS is of key importance for its future. This study therefore 
aims to answer the question:  
What is the effect of the size of firms on transaction costs of the EU ETS and trading tendency in the 
Netherlands in 2016? 
In order to answer the research question a survey was conducted among 39 Dutch firms in the EU 
ETS. In this survey, questions were asked enabling evaluation of the economic costs perceived and 
effects of transaction costs. By evaluating the effect of firm size in both number of total verified 
emissions and number of employees, the existence of variable transaction costs can be evaluated. By 
comparing the effect of an increase in transaction costs on trading tendency the research question 
will be answered. Additionally, by analyzing perceived uncertainties, knowledge of GHG abatement 
costs and categories of transaction costs the nature of transaction costs can be explained. Lastly, the 
delegation theory is tested indicating the structural effect of transaction costs on which department 
is responsible for the EU ETS, affecting trading tendency.  
1.2 Justification 
Investigating the presence and effect of transaction costs is important because of three reasons. 
First, due to growing international interest in achieving GHG abatement via market efficiency, the EU 
ETS functions as pioneer in international carbon trading and provides key lessons for emerging 
emission trading schemes. Global carbon markets grew by USD 175 billion in 2012 alone (Calel 2013, 
107). With the signing of the so-called ‘Paris Agreement’ in 2015, 197 states have agreed to limit the 
global temperature increase to less than 2 degrees Celsius (aiming at 1.5 degrees Celsius) reaffirming 
the support for GHG emission reductions (European Commission 2017b). As result, countries such as 
Japan, Mexico, Brazil, South-Korea, Chile and China have established, or are preparing to establish, 
emission trading schemes whilst keeping a close eye on the development of the EU ETS (Hintermann, 
Peterson and Rickels 2017, 108). Evaluating EU ETS design features, transaction costs and their 
effects is therefore of international importance in making newly emerging emission trading schemes 
succeed and to reach the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
Secondly, the European Commission and national authorities lack knowledge on the firm-level 
evaluation of the EU ETS complicating design changes and monitoring. For example, in order to 
mature the EU ETS market the European Commission will include the EU ETS in the application of the 
new European ‘Markets in Financial Instrument Directive 2’ (MiFID II). The MiFID II implies the 
monitoring of the EU ETS by financial authorities, as part of the European Commission’s effort to 
fight the complexity and lack of transparency of the financial markets as exposed in the financial 
crisis of 2008. General goals of the MiFID II include: 1. Increasing transparency and availability of 
market information, 2. Improving integrity and protecting participants and 3. Improving the 
efficiency by improving the structure of financial markets (European Commission 2014). In short, one 
could conclude that the goal is to lower overall transaction costs of the EU ETS. However, 
implementing the MiFID II has proven a struggle. The International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA, representing greenhouse gas emitting firms) accused the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) of disproportionately affecting smaller firms which are not financial institutions 
(ICIS 2015). Instead of enhancing the market, “numerous capital requirements”, “procedural 
requirements” and the applying “for a MiFID license” would negatively affect the liquidity of the EU 
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ETS market and cause “substantial costs to market participants”, according to IETA. The 
implementation of the MiFID II has therefore been postponed from January 2017 to January 2018, as 
the ESMA and national authorities concluded they missed “essential data structures” for technical 
implementation, as well as experience with and sufficient evaluation of, EU ETS market flaws 
(European Council 2015; Council Directive 2016/1034/EU, art. 3). By interviewing the Dutch 
Emissions Authority (the NEa – responsible for the EUA register and monitoring of emission reports) 
and the Dutch Authority Financial Markets (AFM - responsible for implementation of the MiFID II), I 
learned that the NEa and AFM experience an information deficit of the evaluation of the EU ETS by 
Dutch firms as well. In addition, they too suspect sectoral and firm size related differences to affect 
EU ETS market access. The NEa and AFM therefore informed me they have a sincere interest in this 
research which might increase the comprehension of the market and its participants and reduce 
information asymmetry.  
Lastly, current research is limited, and, above all, outdated. There have been approximately 21 
articles written based on firm-level evaluation in the first two phases of the EU ETS (until 2012), of 
which five articles marginally cover the Netherlands. Additionally, in contrast to other countries (e.g. 
Germany: KfW), no annual study on firm-level evaluation of the EU ETS exists in the Netherlands. In 
my preliminary research I had contact with dominant writers such as Anita Engels and Karoline Rogge 
on their research and methods applied. Both were unaware of new or current research on the 
matter. In her literature review as published in September 2016, Karoline Rogge even advised to 
delay new research until the end of 2017, awaiting the effect of the major changes in EU ETS policy 
(Rogge 2016, 26). Until that time, she proposes to research the efficiency of the EU ETS on national 
level, preferable through evaluation with stakeholders.  
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In order to answer the research question, this thesis will start by providing the theoretical framework 
in the second chapter. In the first section of the second chapter I will discuss environmental 
economics and the difficulties of reducing emissions by explaining the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. 
This will be followed by the second section reviewing possible solutions based on rational choice 
institutionalism. This will clarify why regulating the environment poses such a difficult task and why 
the European Commission chose cap and trade as governmental intervention. In the third section 
transaction costs as threshold to cap and trade are introduced, followed by the fourth section in 
which the establishment and chosen design for the EU ETS will be examined. By reviewing EUA price 
development and design features of the three phases it will become clear how, despite taking lessons 
learned by previous emission trade schemes into account, the institutional design of the EU ETS has 
failed to prevent overallocation of allowances, price volatility and market uncertainties.  
In the literature review I will discuss the question whether (and if so, how) these setbacks and 
institutional changes throughout the phases have affected firms. By reviewing technological 
innovation and organizational innovation differences between level of innovation of firms in terms of 
size (in number of employees and total amount of verified emissions) and sector will become clear. 
The differences between firms in size will be further reviewed by discussing studies researching the 
transaction costs associated with EU ETS participation and the effect on trading tendency. This will 
provide the basis for my research. The second chapter ends with a summary of all hypotheses. 
In the third chapter the research design is explained, discussing the concepts, operationalization of 
variables and the use of a survey. The results of the survey are presented in chapter four. This thesis 
concludes with chapter five which summarizes the results of the study. In the discussion these 
conclusions will be evaluated with branch organizations, formulating policy recommendations. I end 
by evaluating the limitations of this research on which I base my suggestions for further research.  
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2. Theory 
 
2.1 Environmental economics 
The establishment of the EU ETS is based on the idea of economizing the collective action problem of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change by creating an economic incentive to abate emissions. 
The rationale behind environmental economics will be explained in this chapter by discussing the 
collective action problem and its solution as to be found in rational choice institutionalism. This 
second chapter will conclude by comparing the pros and cons of two forms of governmental 
intervention (tax and cap and trade) and the choice for cap and trade in establishing the EU ETS. 
The collective action problem 
The collective action problem is also known as ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin 1968, 26). ‘The 
commons’ are non-excludable, rivalrous goods, which benefits are enjoyed by one whilst the costs 
are shared among all. The universal example of a collective action problem is that of a piece of land, 
open to all (Hardin 1968, 28). On the land, herdsman can let their cattle graze. However, if all 
herdsmen let their cattle graze at once the grass won’t regrow and no food is left for the cattle. Yet 
as long as there are herdsmen there is cattle which needs to eat. For a herdsman, adding one sheep 
means a +1 profit, and a negative impact of -1 on the land. But since the land is a common, the 
negative impact of -1 is shared with other herdsmen and neglectable in contrast to the +1 profit for 
the herdsman that added the sheep. Therefore this herdsman will make the rational choice of adding 
an extra sheep to is herd. If all herdsmen act in such a rational self-interest, in the end the common 
good will be depleted. A similar example of a collective action problem uses herring in the North Sea, 
suffering from overfishing.  
Our environment is considered a common good as well (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003, 1907). 
Industrial, combustion and manufacturing sectors emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in order to e.g. 
generate electricity, manufacture paper or bricks for on the street. As there is an apparent 
inexhaustible source of air and water to consume, no private costs are experienced by the sectors. 
However, the emission of greenhouse gasses negatively affects our environment and instigates 
climate change, causing external costs on society. These costs are also known as negative 
externalities: costs suffered by third parties as a result of an economic transaction (Andrew 2008, 
396). However, as no economic costs are experienced by the firms, prices for consumers will remain 
the same. This leads to overconsumption by consumer and sectors, leading to an efficiency (or 
welfare) loss as portrayed in figure 1.  
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Figure 1 - Negative externalities leading to a difference between marginal social costs and marginal private 
costs, resulting in an efficiency loss 
In figure 1, the socially optimal output is where marginal social benefit (MSB) meets marginal social 
costs (MSC) at B (at Q2). However, as social (external) costs are not experienced the free market 
equilibrium will occur where marginal social benefit meets marginal private costs (MPC) at A. The 
difference between point A and C reflects the welfare loss of the neglected social costs (EPA 2000, 
113). It has been calculated that the average social cost of carbon pollution by each ton of CO2 
emitted estimates around EUR 40. If we assume Q1 at point A to be one ton of CO2, the difference 
between point A and C will therefore be EUR 40 (Clò 2011, 63). Since in the Netherlands the CO2 
emissions of electricity production alone are 50,000,000 tCO2, the total social costs of carbon 
pollution in the Netherlands may amount to billions EUR (PBL 2012).  
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Solving the collective action problem: Rational Choice Institutionalism 
In the article ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’ by Dietz (et al 2003) solutions are proposed to 
overcome the collective action problem. An emphasis is put upon the importance of awareness of 
the effects of neglecting the costs of consuming a common good. Through the collecting and 
spreading of information on the effects of the ‘tragedy’ self-governing arrangements can emerge on 
their own. As sectors become aware of the effects of overfishing or overgrazing it is expected that 
actors involved shall come to the rational decision for collective action, creating arrangements to 
address overconsumption (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003, 1908).  
For example, Ronald Coase argued that by establishing property rights, herdsmen can divide and 
share land. If a herdsman overgrazes your piece of land, additional property rights will have to be 
bought, creating private costs for the herdsman by taking externalities into account (Coase 1960, 3). 
However, defining and establishing property rights for e.g. the sea and the allowed amount of 
herring to be fished poses a more complex challenge. According to Prakash and Gugerty (2010) 
fishermen can also join clubs that regulate and monitor consumption of the common good. 
Conditions for such self-governing arrangements are that the use of resources can be monitored, 
actors within the club continuously communicate and outsiders can be excluded at low costs (free 
rider problem) (Prakash and Gugerty 2010, 32). Monitoring and communication will prevent a 
prisoners dilemma, where an information deficit of consumption of the common good by actors will 
lead to trust-issues, and negatively affect compliance. For example, by monitoring and publishing the 
amount of fish caught (and punishing overconsumption) fishermen can be assured compliance of all 
fishermen with the set agreements. Communication promotes social norms stimulating participants 
to comply and cooperate. Lastly, it is important to be able to exclude outsiders as access to the 
common by free riders will make self-governing arrangements fail as the good will be accessible 
nevertheless (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003, 1908). 
However, in contrast to grass or herring, a shortage of ‘our environment’ is more difficult to perceive 
as costs to actors involved. Whereas fishermen will be confronted with empty seas and herdsmen 
with dry fields, CO2 emitters will not directly be harmed by climate change. As markets are based on 
scarcity, no experienced scarcity or costs of the common good of ‘our environment’ will result in a 
failing market. Or to cite Hardin: “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968, 29). The 
slogan used in fighting climate change stresses the bottleneck: “Think Globally but Act Locally”. The 
causes of climate can be found on individual scale, whilst the effects are global. Successfully reducing 
emissions should therefore ask for dramatic changes in behavior on multiple levels: within families, 
communities, sectors and governments (Ostrom 2010, 551). According to Brennan (2009) these 
changes are so drastic, “no one will voluntarily change behavior to reduce energy use and GHG 
emissions”. Consequently, governmental intervention is necessary to enforce rules to change 
incentives to all involved (Ostrom 10, 551).  
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2.2 Governmental intervention 
Governments can intervene through facilitating information, subsidies, taxes and selling permits. 
Awareness can be created by providing, or forcing producers to provide, consumers with information 
of e.g. the amount of CO2 pollution associated with their flight ticket. By subsidizing electric cars or 
solar panels governments can further induce consumers to diminish CO2 emissions. Such awareness 
can lead to a technology push or a market pull effect. In case of a technology push, innovation of 
green technology will be pushed onto the market without proper consideration whether this product 
satisfies a consumers need. In contrast, a market pull is based on the idea of actual consumer 
demand for green technology (Di Stefano, Gambardella and Verona 2012, 1283). However, the 
greatest effect is reached by internalizing the externalities: including the social (external) costs in the 
final price of the good (Gagelmann and Frondel 2005, 205).  
Tax 
The first method to internalize negative externalities is by taxing producers the external costs of 
emissions in producing their product. For example by taxing carbon-based fuels used in industrial 
processes. The cost price and consequently selling price of the product will increase, which will result 
in consumers also experiencing the social costs of the emissions. As the price of the product 
increases, the amount of emissions is expected to decrease. A new equilibrium will be reached at the 
socially efficient output where marginal social costs meets marginal social benefit (Andrew 2008, 
400). The red arrows in the left graph of figure 2 illustrate the effect of a carbon tax. As the tax is set 
to increase the price at Q1 from P0 to P2, a new equilibrium is reached at Q2 where marginal social 
costs (MSC) meet marginal social benefits (MSB).  
  
Figure 2 – Governmental intervention via either Tax (L) or. Cap and Trade (R)  
Cap and Trade 
The concept of carbon trade as solution to the collective action problem of climate change is a bit 
more complex. A simplified illustration can be found in the right graph in figure 2. The red square 
illustrates a ‘cap’ placed on the total number of tons of CO2 allowed to be emitted by firms at Q2. No 
matter how high the price will go, emissions remain limited at Q2. Therefore the new equilibrium will 
again be reached at P2. However, by issuing allowances worth one ton of CO2, a market is created 
allowing trade. By lowering the ‘cap’ with a linear factor, allowances will become more scarce, 
leading to a higher demand and a higher allowance price. Three strategies will remain for firms 
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within an emission trading scheme confronted with scarcity: 1. Buy allowances to maintain 
production capacity, 2. Reduce the production capacity or 3. Invest in CO2 abatement technology. 
Firms can pass costs of the emissions trading scheme on to the consumer through their product 
price, thus internalizing externalities (PBL 2013, 13).  
Pros and Cons 
Tax and cap and trade share some great advantages. For example, both systems encourage 
investments in technological innovation to reduce GHG emissions at the lowest costs. Moreover, 
after reducing GHG emissions, firms can offer consumers a product without having to pay either a 
carbon tax or the costs of buying EUAs, leading to a competitive advantage and higher demand due 
to a lower total price (C2ES 2009, 1). Additionally, both raise a revenue for the government. In 
contrast to e.g. road taxes, the revenue of carbon tax has no direct destination as its aim is to merely 
raise awareness of the full social costs of consuming a carbon-intensive good. Therefore the total tax 
burden on consumers will not increase as revenue of the carbon tax can be used to reduce other 
taxes. However, revenues can also be used to subsidize alternatives or repair damage caused by 
pollution by for example replanting trees in Brazilian rainforests. Likewise, the revenue of auctioning 
emissions rights can be used for similar purposes (C2ES 2009, 1). Lastly, in comparison to command 
and control systems where requirements are put upon firms and strictly monitored, cost savings by 
using market-based systems can reach up to 90% (Gagelmann and Frondel 2005, 205).  
However, both systems do have some important differences. First, the mechanisms of carbon tax 
and cap and trade differ in performance under uncertainty in making cost-benefit calculations of 
reducing emissions (Grantham Research Institute 2013). Whereas a carbon tax ensures an explicit 
price for emitting a unit of CO2, uncertainty exists on the environmental goal of quantity of 
emissions. Contrariwise, in the system of cap and trade uncertainty exist on the price of pollution, 
whilst the ‘cap’ does provide a set environmental goal. Which uncertainty is preferred depends on 
the expected effect of changes in level of emissions on environmental damage (cap and trade), and 
price of reducing pollution on level of emissions (tax). 
Second, whereas a carbon tax poses an immediate cost for both firms and consumers influencing 
market prices, cap and trade offers firms a gradual reduction of allowances. This enables firms to 
thoroughly investigate their options in deciding on a strategy and therefore allow a more controlled 
transition (Grantham Research Institute 2013). Additionally, allowances are allocated to firms by 
either auctioning or free allocation by a so-called ‘grandfathering’ mechanism. Free allocation allows 
smaller and more vulnerable firms and sectors more time and lower compliance costs to adjust to an 
emissions trading scheme. Moreover, it helps to address carbon leakage: firms moving their CO2 
emissions to a country with a more ‘relaxed policy’, evading abatements costs as well as negatively 
affecting their native economy (PBL 2013, 17).  
Third, both systems differ in complexity. A great advantage of cap and trade is that allowance prices 
automatically adjust to changes in abatement costs due to changes in fossil fuels prices, 
technological innovation or electricity demand. In contrast, changes in tax are administratively 
difficult and politically sensitive. Therefore in cap and trade firms will always be able to reduce 
emissions at the point abatement costs are lowest, which results in the lowest cost for society 
(Gagelmann and Hansjürgens 2002, 187). Though, this is only reached when the EU ETS market 
functions and motivates trading. In addition, allowance prices can be sensitive to regulatory changes 
and economic shocks as well, increasing uncertainties. Moreover, cap and trade can suffer from 
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loopholes and lobbying. Implementing cap and trade therefore poses a complex task for both 
government as firms with a high administrative burden (Gagelmann and Hansjürgens 2002, 188). In 
contrast, implementing a carbon tax is a simple solution allowing easy compliance.  
 Table 1 Comparison of characteristics of the solutions 'Tax' and 'Cap and trade' on firm-level 
The choice for cap and trade and establishment of EU ETS  
According to Dan Esty (environmental policy professor at Yale University, USA) the decisive factor for 
governments to choose for cap and trade is the freedom associated with a market system in contrast 
to a tax: 
 “There’s not a person in a business anywhere who gets up in the morning and says, ‘Gee, I want to 
race into the office to follow some regulation.’. On the other hand, if you say, ‘There’s an upside 
potential here you’re going to make money,’, people do get up early and do drive hard around the 
possibility of finding themselves winners on this.” (Connif 2009) 
Moreover, the cost-efficiency of the cap and trade system proved it success early on with the 
phasing-out of leaded petrol in 1982 in the United States. In the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) report in 1986 cost savings where estimated to reach between the USD five and twelve billion 
(Calel 2013, 109). This motivated US president George H.W. Bush in 1990 to create the first national 
emissions trade market for sulfur dioxide: the Acid Rain Program (Calel 2013, 110). As result, SO2 
emissions decreased by 36 percent in the period 1990 to 2004 (Schmalensee and Stavins 2015, 5). 
The cost-efficiency of cap and trade again proofed to be a major success as the US Acid Rain Program 
saved an estimated amount of USD 1 billion on society in comparison to what command and control 
regulations would have cost (Calel 2013, 110). 
Consequently, as it was decided to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide by 20% by 2005 during 
the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, academic support grew for global cap and trade 
as they considered it the only “realistic chance of success” to fight climate change (Calel 2013, 110). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), tasked to evaluate the risks of climate 
change by reviewing environmental research and publishing reports, underscored this conclusion in 
their report in 1995 stating “for a global treaty, a tradeable quota system is the only potentially cost-
effective arrangement where an agreed level of emissions is attained with certainty” (IPCC 1995, 
401). The success of the system led to the defect of several major firms from the regulation 
resistance (IPCC 2001), supporting carbon regulation under the condition of using the concept of cap 
and trade. Consequently, during the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2 in 1996 the US 
announced their new stance for binding commitments, favoring international carbon trading (Calel 
2013, 110). 
Kyoto protocol 
In the year following (1997), 69 countries agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing to reduce GHG 
emissions by 20% in 2020 and 80-95% in 2050 against 1990 levels (European Commission 2017a) and 
specifying means of action to fight climate change. The Kyoto Protocol introduced two aspects which 
are part of the basis of the establishment of the EU ETS: 1. Absolute quantitative and internationally 
 Uncertainties Costs Complexity 
Tax Quantity of emissions High immediate costs Low 
Cap and trade Price of emissions Gradually increasing costs High 
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binding emission targets and 2. Flexible mechanisms. In addition to measures to be taken 
domestically by states, the Kyoto Protocol offered three flexible mechanisms to meet the targets in a 
cost-efficient manner: 1. International emission trading (IET), 2. Joint Implementation (JI) and 3. the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (European Commission 2006). The IET allows firms to buy 
‘Kyoto units’ (allowances) from other participating countries in order to meet domestic reduction 
targets. JI allows investment in emission reductions in another country where costs for reducing 
emissions may be cheaper. In turn Emission Reduction Units (or credits) are received equivalent to 
one ton of CO2. Lastly, the CDM allows participating countries to meet Kyoto reduction targets by 
buying Certified Emission Reduction units from projects in developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force in 2005 (Calel 2013, 108).  
EU ETS 
In 1998, sparked by the Kyoto protocol, the European Commission came to a turnaround indicating 
the possibility of a carbon trading system in the EU. Similarly, European firms established a non-profit 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), bringing together policy makers, academics and 
executive boards of firms to discuss carbon markets in order to accelerate support. As result, more 
firms decided to launch their own trading schemes, and more lobby groups and trading associations 
were established in member states favoring cap and trade (Calel 2013, 111). For example, after the 
announcement of a Climate Change Levy in the UK in 1999 30 organizations established the UK 
Emissions Trading Group with the goal to persuade the UK parliament to reevaluate their proposal 
and favor a trading scheme instead (Smith and Swierbinski 2007, 135). Consequently, in 2002 the UK 
pioneered with the launch of the UK Emission Trading Scheme (UK ETS), the first multi-industry 
trading scheme in the world, supplementing the Climate Change Levy (Calel 2013, 111). The 
existence of a trading scheme in a member state sparked great interest in carbon trade in Europe. In 
contrast, cap and trade pioneer the US unexpectedly turned its back on the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. 
The new Bush Administration feared harm for the US economy, and criticized the exemption of 
developing countries (Borger 2001). Moreover, during the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference (7) in 2001 states failed in reaching an agreement on the rules for an international 
carbon market (Calel 2013, 111). Ironically, after a failure of introducing an EU carbon tax and 
resisting emissions trading as solution in the Kyoto protocol, the EU which finally agreed on 
supporting an international emission market was now confronted with bailing international support. 
Only a successful introduction of an EU emission trading scheme could now proof the assets of a cap 
and trade system in reaching the goals of the Kyoto protocol. In December 2002 the last EU member 
state, Germany, declared its support for the establishment of the EU ETS. In July 2003, the EU 
parliament adopted the directive establishing the EU ETS as to be launched January 1st 2005 
(2003/87/EC). The EU ETS was set to become the largest emission trading scheme in the world, 
covering 31 countries and 40% of the total GHG emissions in the EU.  
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2.3 Transaction costs as threshold  
With the establishment of the EU ETS the European Commission succeeded in creating the world’s 
first international emission trade scheme. However, establishing and maintaining a cap and trade 
system is a complex task requiring a strong institutional framework. Especially in the case of the EU 
ETS, as it had to be introduced in substantially varying national economies and sectors. In this section 
I define the goals of the EU ETS and evaluate the methods used to test whether these goals are being 
reached. This will introduce the effect of uncertainties and the resulting concept of transaction costs 
as greatest threshold in making the EU ETS succeed.  
Goals EU ETS 
According to the EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 
October 2003, the main (and short-term) goal of the EU ETS is to comply with the Kyoto Protocol of 
reducing the GHG emissions EU-wide by 20% in 2020 and 80-95% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels, 
at a minimal cost (Hu et al 2015, 152). However, the European Commission states that the most 
important objective is to enhance long-term innovation to ensure the transition from a high-carbon 
economy towards a low-carbon economy (Rogge 2016, 3; Martin, Muuls and Wagner 2012, 2). 
Therefore in the long haul, environmental technological innovation is considered the most important 
factor to evaluate the effectivity of environmental policy (Rogge 2016, 3).  
Short term - Abatement of emissions  
To evaluate the short-term effect of reducing GHG emissions, historical emission data from the 
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) of the EU ETS can be reviewed. By comparing data of 
2005 with current data of 2016, a reduction of emissions can be calculated by subtracting 2005 levels 
with 2016 levels. However, economic growth might have influenced (sector-specific) production 
levels affecting total emission levels as well. For example, emission levels per year were found to 
differ up to 5% in the years 1990 until 2004 due to production level changes (Calel 2013, 112). 
Abatement could have occurred nevertheless (Rogge 2016, 23). In order to analyze the effect of the 
EU ETS on CO2 emissions reductions it is therefore vital to account for changes in productions levels 
on firm level. Production level data, however, is barely available as it is considered competitively 
sensitive information. This impedes the possibility to accurately assess the effect of the EU ETS on 
the abatement of emissions (Rogge 2016, 5). 
Long term – Environmental Innovation 
In contrast to the short term goal of abatement of emissions, environmental innovation can be 
assessed allowing evaluation of the effectivity of the EU ETS. Still, this is a very complex process in 
which qualitative and quantitative methods are combined to ensure validity of results (Rogge 2016, 
3).  
Definition environmental innovation 
Ideally, the price of EUAs mirrors a scarcity of allowances and the market mechanism ensures equal 
marginal abatements costs to all participants. This is known as the static efficiency. The dynamic 
efficiency should be reached by the monetary incentives of the EUA price, leading to environmental 
innovation (Cames 2010, 56). In the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Oslo Manual, innovation is defined as “the implementation of new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in 
business practices, workplace organization or external relations” (Rogge 2016, 7). However, no 
standardized definition for environmental innovation exists. In general environmental innovation (or 
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EI) refers to “any product, process, organizational, social or institutional innovation that is able to 
reduce environmental impact and resource use” (Borghesi, Cainelli and Mazzanti 2014, 669). 
Similarly, a lack of consensus exists on what the innovative effects are of environmental regulation, 
especially in comparison to other factors such as technology push, market pull and firm-specific 
factors. Or, for example, macroeconomic fluctuations such as the economic crisis of 2008 (Martin, 
Muuls and Wagner 2012, 4). Rogge adds that environmental innovation is “dynamic, interactive and 
uncertain process”, of which the abilities to be researched are limited (Rogge 2016, 3). Measuring 
and evaluating the effect of the EU ETS for both the short- and long-term goals of the EU ETS 
therefore poses a very complex task. 
Organizational & Technological innovation 
To evaluate the long-term environmental innovation impact of the EU ETS, innovation has therefore 
been differentiated into technological and organizational innovation. Organizational innovation 
contains all changes in organization to facilitate environmental policy compliance. Examples include 
changes in departments responsible, methods of retrieving information or participating within a cap 
and trade market. In contrast, technological innovation includes actual product, production and 
process innovations. Examples are investments in technology and improvements in for example use 
of materials and production and delivery methods (Rogge 2016, 3). Organizational innovation can be 
researched by tracking the effect of the policy of the EU ETS on organizational changes. In contrast, 
technological innovation can still be affected by other factors such as technology push, market pull, 
macroeconomic and firm-specific factors (Martin et al 2012, 4). To understand effectivity of the EU 
ETS it is therefore important to review both factors to ensure causation between the EU ETS and 
environmental innovation. 
Transaction costs  
Organizational innovation is studied by reviewing the extent to which individual firms have managed 
to develop and implement intra-organizational proceedings and structures to innovate their 
organization in order to comply to- and take part in the EU ETS. In the past 12 years academics have 
therefore tried to define key variables to understand what affects the development of firms’ EU ETS 
strategy: how do firms decide whether and how to participate in the EU ETS market?  
In theory, the market mechanism should be the main instrument for firms to decide on their EU ETS 
strategy. In the short term EUA prices will be driven by three variables: demand, supply and variation 
(Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis 2010, 145). Demand consists of the amount of EUA allocated and 
the growth in economic activity (and therefore: increase in emissions). Supply consist of the 
opportunities for abatement and associated costs. Variation in this model is caused by weather and 
market behavior. To achieve the most cost-efficient solution, firms may use information provided by 
the market mechanism of the EU ETS as illustrated in figure 3. For example: if few EUAs are (freely) 
allocated, and there is a strong economic growth and a very cold winter leading to high CO2 
emissions projections, one can expect a relative high demand for allowances. However, if fuel prices 
are high, and the sectoral costs for abatements are low, CO2 abatement is expected which could lead 
to a supply of allowances – leveling out the high demand and retaining the EUA price.  
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Figure 3 - A market model of factors influencing a sector surplus of shortfall of EUA (Turner 2005) 
However, for long term decisions and great investments stability and information is needed to 
reduce uncertainties for individuals firms in shaping their EU ETS strategy. To indicate the complexity 
of developing an EU ETS strategy, Anita Engels formulated six questions a firm has to answer (Engels 
2009, 490):  
1. What determines the company’s own demand for allowances? 
2. How will the CO2 emissions develop over the years? 
3. To what extent is the development of the EUA price sensitive to several factors such as 
weather, economic growth, competitors, changes in production, and the behavior of 
suppliers and customers?  
4. What are the technological options available to a company that must reduce its own CO2 
emissions, and at what costs? 
5. What determines the costs of a balanced allowances account at the end of the year? 
6. Does an allowance represent a cost or an asset? 
These questions can be summarized to one main question: 
1. What are my abatement costs? (Engels 2009, 492) 
In answering the question of ‘What are my abatement costs?’ firms need organizational structures 
which provide them order, transparency, information, reliability and tools enabling them to 
participate in the market (Matisoff 2010, 4). However, each firm differs to some extent in either 
sector, production process, size, experience with or capacity for (emissions) trading. Therefore a 
perfect fit between EU ETS policy, institutional structures and firms is near to impossible. 
Consequently, it is inevitable that firms will experience some uncertainties and frictions, spending 
time and costs in for example consulting experts to understand the EU ETS, find trade partners of 
EUAs and investigating technology for CO2 abatement. These costs are known as transaction costs.  
Transaction costs in environmental economics 
The earliest definition of transaction costs is by Coase (1937), as “the costs of using the price 
mechanism”. In 1961 Coase further specified these costs: “In order to carry out a market transaction 
it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to 
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deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to 
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, 
and so on” (Wang 2003, 2). This definition focusses on the “economic value of resources used in 
locating trading partners and executing transactions” (Wang 2003, 2). However, over the course of 
time the definition of transaction costs has become broader, varying per field of research. In these 
studies, transaction costs may also imply secondary costs in e.g. negotiation and enforcement of 
government regulation. It is therefore important to specify which definition will be used in this study.  
In environmental economics Stavins (1994), Tietenberg (1986) and Montero (1998) do not restrict 
transaction costs to the costs of search, negotiation and decision-making in trading allowances alone. 
Instead, in order for ex post evaluation of cost-effectiveness of emission trading schemes Tietenberg 
and Coase argue all costs should be addressed, including administration-, management-, trade- and 
abatement-costs (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2010, 193). The definition most commonly used in 
environmental economics today is that of the OECD (2001) as “the costs of gathering information, 
making decisions/contracting, and controlling/policing” (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2010, 1992).  
Variable transaction costs 
Transaction costs can make or break a market system, especially when the burden of transaction 
costs is unequally distributed. In environmental economics, "market efficiency depends on market 
participants’ ability to access information” (Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis 2008, 15). Therefore 
linear (thus equal) transaction costs are fundamental for cost-effectiveness, as variable transaction 
costs (or: positive marginal transaction costs) have a more severe impact on smaller participants 
compared to larger ones.  
For example, in case of variable transaction costs, smaller participants in terms of emissions will 
perceive higher transaction costs per ton of CO2, whereas larger participants will perceive lower 
transaction costs per ton of CO2. This leads to a larger optimal firm-size, thus economies of scale 
where large emitters will perceive lower marginal costs. As result, larger firms will experience less 
burden of complying to and participating in the EU ETS. This allows them to reach a more cost-
efficient strategy in which they can emit more CO2 for a lower price. In contrast, smaller firms will 
experience more costs for e.g. trading or calculating abatement costs, therefore reduce risk of 
noncompliance by emitting less and abating more CO2. Consequently, this would negatively affect 
market entrance for smaller participants and weaken competition, leading to lower numbers of EUAs 
traded and hindering the cost-effective allocation of EUAs. Essentially, this harms the principle of the 
EU ETS of ‘the polluter pays’, which might finally result in a market failure (Heindl 2012; Jaraité, 
Convery and Di Maria 2010; Jaraité-Kazukauské and Kazukauskas 2015; Stavins 1994). Therefore, the 
understanding and addressing of transaction costs in the EU ETS is of key importance for its future.  
Examples from cap and trade 
In former emission trading schemes transaction costs and their effects have already been identified. 
In the empirical analysis of US trading systems Kerr and Maré (1998) found an efficiency loss of 10-
20% due to transaction costs. Comparable, trading incentives in the Regional Clear Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM) in southern-California would have increased by 12-32% without transaction costs 
(Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2010, 1991). These transaction costs were mainly based on the great 
number of uncertainties in anticipating regulation in developing strategy, the costs of complying and 
reporting to the regulation itself, and simple design errors. For example in the RECLAIM historical 
peak productions levels 60% above actual emissions levels were used to allocate allowances resulting 
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in overallocation of allowances. Moreover, as banking of allowances (reserving abundant allowances) 
was not allowed, firms could not compensate for their peak in production during the California 
energy crisis in 2010 resulting in an increase of allowance prices per ton NOx/SOx of 1200%. 
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2015, 7). 
In contrast, other systems successfully minimized uncertainties and provide the EU ETS with great 
lessons. For example the simplicity of the design, minimal government meddling in trade and banking 
possibilities were named as reasons for the success of the phasing-out of leaded petrol (Schmalensee 
and Stavins 2015, 4). Or in the Acid Rain Program, where compliance was ensured by strictly 
monitoring emissions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and high penalties of USD 2000 
per ton of SO2. Moreover, by creating structures and informing firms two years prior the start of the 
Acid Rain program of its limits, regulation and organization firms could properly prepare themselves 
to minimalize surprises and uncertainties (Schmalensee and Stavins 2015, 5). Additionally, facile 
trading and banking without authority approval eased market participation, whilst free allocation of 
allowances ensured broad support (Schmalensee and Stavins 2015, 6). 
2.4 Uncertainties in the EU ETS: the first three phases 
As result, by being a pioneer in cap and trade the US and UK provided the EU with multiple lessons 
which should have enhanced the understanding of how to successfully establish the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme. In short, the lessons that should be learned from the lead-trade, 
RECLAIM, Acid Rain Program and UK ETS are:  
1. Ensure stability and certainty prior to the start of the emissions program through complete 
instruments and informational structures 
2. Allow banking to ensure compliance in unanticipated circumstances  
3. Minimalize efforts to trade and participate in the market 
4. Allocate free allowances for broad political support  
5. Ensure strict monitoring and sufficient height of fines 
The question is whether the EU ETS succeeded in taking note of these lessons and minimalized 
uncertainties and transaction costs. In this section the establishment and design of the EU ETS will be 
discussed. By reviewing the first three phases, setbacks and policy design changes we get an 
indication of the institutional complexity of the EU ETS and the uncertainties firms were confronted 
with. The EUA price development provides a first signal of their effect on the EU ETS market. 
Framework 
In the initial design of the EU ETS policy writers seem to have taken note of the lessons learned by 
former cap and trade programs. The EU ETS has been built on three pillars: 1. Cap, 2. Trade and 3. 
Free allocation. The setting of the cap provides the threshold, an incontestable number of allowed 
emissions in the EU ETS. The trading of European Union Allowances (EUAs) provides participants a 
cost-efficient solution as alternative to investing in CO2 abatement technology. Lastly, free allocation 
allows smaller and more vulnerable firms and sectors more time and lower compliance costs to 
adjust to the EU ETS (Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis 2008, 9). Moreover, it helps to address 
carbon leakage: firms moving their CO2 emissions to a country with a more ‘relaxed policy’, evading 
abatements costs as well as negatively affecting their native economy (Martin et al 2012, 7). 
Furthermore, in order to anticipate expected thresholds in implementing the emission trading 
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scheme and prevent uncertainties the EU ETS is divided in four phases: Phase 1 (2005-2007), Phase 2 
(2008-2012), Phase 3 (2012-2020) and Phase 4 (2021-2030).  
Phase 1 (2005-2007) 
Phase 1 of the EU ETS has been characterized as the three yearlong starting, or pilot, phase of the EU 
ETS (Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis 2008, 12). Its main objective was to create the infrastructure 
and establish the institutions needed, building experience and learning-by-doing in preparation of 
phase 2 and the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It can be said that the first two years 
did not disappoint in providing a learning experience for the EU ETS.  
In phase 1 the EU ETS only covered energy intensive sectors such as oil refining, iron, steel and power 
and heat generating installations. Additionally, member states were allowed to decide on the 
amount of freely allocated allowances in writing their National Allocation Plans (NAPs). However, 
firms were not yet allowed to bank their allowances. Lastly, the penalty for non-compliance was set 
to only EUR 40 per ton of CO2 (European Commission 2017c).  
Overallocation 
To organize allocation and verify and monitor emissions national authorities (such as the Dutch 
Emission Authority, NEa) were established (Engels 2009, 489). Firms were obliged to annually report 
their emissions, which the national authority will use to write National Allocation Plans (NAPs). All 
NAPs in turn will have to be examined and approved by the European Commission in order to not set 
the total cap too generous, demonstrating two principal criteria: 1. A total amount of EUAs lower 
than business-as-usual levels and 2. Member states should show a clear intention of reaching the 
goals set by the Kyoto Protocol (Laing et al 2013, 7).  
Not only were these criteria susceptible to different interpretations, national authorities were also 
confronted with a lack of information in writing the first NAPs. In 2005, firms were required to set a 
cap on each of their installations based on historical data. However, this information was not 
available in time, forcing national authorities to rely on unverified emissions data provided by the 
firms themselves (Ellerman and Buchner 2008, 277). Many firms abused this freedom and 
exaggerated their historic amounts of emissions to increase the assigned amount of freely allocated 
EUAs. Moreover, member states and the European Commission failed to agree on the total number 
of emissions allowed on time, until far into phase 1, causing unnecessary uncertainty in regulation 
(Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis 2010, 38). As result, the writing of the NAPs was characterized by 
strategic behavior and lobbying between industry, member states and the European Commission 
(Wrake et al 2012, 13). Despite the efforts of industry and member states the European Commission 
decided to adjust 14 of the 25 NAPs in phase 1 to ensure GHG reduction, allocating 6.5 billion tons of 
allowances. Nonetheless, firms were allocated too many EUAs than they should have based on their 
actual historic emissions data and felt less burden than sectors outside the EU ETS in reaching the 
Kyoto target (Wrake et al 2012, 14). Nevertheless, EUA prices in the first year of trading were higher 
than experts had expected, even reaching a price of EUR 27 per EUA (see figure 4). However, one 
year later the European Commission published the first verified emissions data. Whilst the EU ETS 
market expected a scarcity of allowances, it was confronted with ‘the information shock’ as the 
emissions data showed a 4% allowance surplus (Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis 2008, 15). This 
led to a dramatic fall of EUA prices, and disruption of the stable and long-term EUA price signal used 
by market participants to calculate their EU ETS strategy (Hintermann, Peterson, Rickels 2017, 113). 
As no banking of allowances was allowed, the price of EUA dropped to zero at the end of phase 1.  
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Figure 4 - EUA price development - 2005-2016 (Investing.com 2017) 
Phase 2 (2008-2012) 
Still scarred by the low EUA prices, phase 2 (2008-2012) allowed a semi-fresh start for the 
jeopardized credibility of the EU ETS. In the second phase the cap on EUAs was dropped by 6.5%. 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway joined the EU ETS as well. Moreover, the scope of the EU ETS was 
broadened to include nitrous oxide as emitted through nitric acid production. Additionally, 10% of 
allocated allowances should now be auctioned instead of freely allocated and the penalty for non-
compliance was set to EUR 100 per ton of CO2. Furthermore, NAPs would now be based on verified 
emission data from 2005. Also, credits received by firms through participating in the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation were allowed to be used (European Commission 
2017c). These credits were expected to offer firms cost-effective mitigation options, making the EU 
ETS the international carbon market. This led to a total amount of credits worth 1.4 billion tons of 
CO2 on the EU ETS market (The Climate Policy Hub 2017). In the last year of phase 2 emissions of 
flights within the borders of the EU ETS countries were added to the scope of the EU ETS as well. 
Trading fraud 
In phase 2, trading activity increased. In the EU ETS, EUAs can be traded through a multitude of 
channels: across firms’ installations, directly with other emitters, through a broker, or at exchanges 
such as the EEX or ICE London (Engels 2009, 489). However, as the EU ETS was not considered a 
financial institution monitoring of trading activities remained limited. As member states wanted to 
maintain sovereignty 30 quasi-independent monitoring agencies were established, monitoring the 
national registries together with the ETS in Brussels. This needlessly complexified monitoring 
(Matisoff 2010, 2). Consequently, several cases of fraudulent activity were detected harming EU ETS 
market fidelity. For example in 2008, seven Deutsche Bank managers were found guilty of 
participating in VAT-fraud in EUA-trading through exploiting tax-code variation amongst countries 
causing EUR five billion of damage. Additionally, this resulted in a drop of trading between countries 
with variation in taxes by 90 percent. Similarly in 2010, German firms were victim of a major phishing 
scam allowing criminals to access registry accounts. Due to a lack of monitoring of trading criminals 
succeeded in selling the stolen EUAs for USD four million in Denmark and England (Bierbower 2011). 
This further increased uncertainties and affected market fidelity experienced by firms. 
Despite these frustrations the price of EUAs remained rather stable in phase 2, indicating enhanced 
market performance and knowledge on allocations and more available emission information 
(Hintermann, Peterson and Rickels 2016, 121). However, the economic credit crisis of 2008 
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destabilized all international financial markets, and led to an unexpected reduction of emissions 
resulting in a surplus of EUAs. This in combination with the great amount of CDM and JI credits 
caused a EUA price drop of EUR 20 (see figure 4).  
Phase 3 (2012-2020) 
The fall of the EUA prices (from 28.77 in June 2008 to 10.92 in January 2012) had greatly destabilized 
the market of the EU ETS. At the start of phase 3 the EU therefore made revisions including an 
uniform emission cap for the EU instead of NAPs and a linear decrease of the cap by 1.74% per year 
which should result in a 21% reduction of emissions in 2020 compared to 2005 levels (Wrake et al 
2012, 14). Also, in response to the great EUA surplus the EU postponed the auctioning of 900 million 
EUAs until the end of phase 3 (The Climate Policy Hub 2017). In addition, the EU ETS Auctioning 
Regulation was established to monitor the process and ensure transparent and fair conductions. 
Moreover, free allocation was minimalized to sectors with emissions from other than power 
generation and based on benchmarks, receiving 80% of the appointed free allocated allowances to 
be annually reduced to 30% in 2020. Firms which are considered a risk for leaking carbon will 
continue to receive the full amount of appointed free allocated allowances until 2020. Auctioning has 
therefore become the new standard. Nevertheless, despite institutional improvements the EU ETS 
sadly failed to prevent the effect of the euro crisis of 2009 on market stability. This again lead to a 
EUA price drop to approximately EUR 6 per ton of CO2 which still remains the average EUA-price 
today in 2017 (January 2017: 5.36; Investing.com 2017). 
Sum 
In sum, firms have been confronted with numerous uncertainties which may have led to transaction 
costs. Due to the setbacks and political negotiations various adjustments were made to the 
institutional design leading to unclear rules and regulatory uncertainty (Matisoff 2010, 4). As 
abatement targets remained insecure, firms experienced uncertainty in anticipating EUA price 
development, affecting the process of deducting a long-term EU ETS strategy. Additionally, the 
complex monitoring and compliance systems varying per member state resulted in uncertainties on 
whether firms’ expected and measured emissions levels corresponded, as well as fraud and market 
fidelity (Matisoff 2010, 4). Lastly, the various setbacks have resulted in high EUA price volatility.  
In accounting for these uncertainties firms in the EU ETS are expected to have experienced 
substantial transaction costs, affecting the ability and choice of firms to partake in the EU ETS 
market. Matisoff therefore expects that efficient and effective functioning of the EU ETS have been 
hindered at least in the initial years (Matisoff 2010, 4). In addition, each phase the EU ETS has 
encompassed new, heterogeneous, unexperienced participants from strongly differing sectors and of 
varying firm sizes. Today, the EU ETS covers over 12,000 greenhouse gas emitters in 30 sectors 
(European Commission 2017a). In Germany, 90% of all emissions can be accounted to 10% of all 
participating firms. As 50% of the German firms emit less than 25,000 tCO2 per year, this can be 
considered a highly uneven distribution (Heindl 2012, 3). Chances are variable transaction costs have 
affected smaller firms disproportionately effecting the equity of the EU ETS.  
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2.5 Literature review 
However, literature evaluating the presence and effect of transaction costs in the EU ETS is scarce. 
Most studies focus upon the effect of the EU ETS on technological innovation, with organizational 
innovation as a side effect (Rogge 2016, 3). Furthermore, studies are mainly of a qualitative nature, 
based on interviews, limiting results to one or two sectors within one country. Although the concept 
of the EU ETS is the same for all EU member states, its introduction and implementation in national 
legislation greatly varied. Differences include the amount of scarcity created by the amount of EUAs 
allocated, how EUA allocation was organized and equity of austerity of regulation across sectors 
(Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis 2008; Engels 2009). However, combining and reviewing all 
research does help in establishing an picture of the effect of EU ETS on environmental innovation in 
the first two phases (Rogge 2016, 4). Structural findings can help identify the existence and effect of 
(variable) transaction costs experienced by firms. 
Due to the complexity and overlap of literature, this section will review existing literature in a 
structured order divided in technological innovation, organizational innovation and transaction costs. 
At the end of this section I will summarize my findings and hypotheses.  
Technological innovation 
The long term goal and therefore first indicator of EU ETS effectivity is the amount of technological 
innovation by firms since the start of the EU ETS. Methods which have been used in evaluating the 
technological innovation impact of the EU ETS until today include analyzing expenditures for research 
and development, as well as of patents granted to certain sectors (for innovative technology). In one 
of the first studies on EU ETS innovation by McKinsey in 2005 a survey was conducted across 147 
firms in all sectors (Rogge 2016, 7). In evaluating the first months of the EU ETS 53% of the 
respondents stated that the EU ETS has had a strong or “at least medium” impact on the firms 
decisions regarding investments in technological innovation. In another study by Calel and 
Dechezlepretre (2013) patenting was analyzed up to 2010 in phase 2 of the EU ETS. By comparing 
743 EU ETS firms with 1019 non-EU ETS firm in 18 EU member states the effect of the EU ETS on 
technological innovation could be analyzed. Contrary to the results by McKinsey (2005), Calel and 
Dechezlepretre (2013, 34) concluded that the EU ETS had close to zero impact on technological 
innovation. How could the results of McKinsey’s results study have been so positive? If we look closer 
to the results of McKinsey’s study great differences can be found across sectors. When comparing all 
participating sectors, the strongest impact was felt by the steel industry, refineries and power 
generation sectors at respectively 84%, 60% and 55%. The weakest impact was felt by the chemical 
industry, pulp and paper- and aluminum sectors at 41%, 33% and 0% (Rogge 2016, 23).  
Manufacturing sectors 
This is confirmed by other studies focusing on the manufacturing industry. In a study conducted by 
Martin (et al 2010) in 2009 the technological innovation of 190 manufacturing firms in the United 
Kingdom was compared, of which 33 were part of the EU ETS. Here, minimal evidence was found of 
technological innovation induced by the EU ETS. In another study by Martin (et al 2012) interviews 
were conducted with 800 firms in manufacturing sectors, across six EU member states. Of these 800 
firms 446 were part of the EU ETS. This study too finds that in phase II of the EU ETS a minimal 
positive relation existed between the EU ETS and technological innovation (Martin et al 2012, 23). 
Similar studies in Germany (Rogge et al 2011, 13), Norway (Gulbrandson and Stenqvist 2013) and 
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Italy (Gasbarro, Rizi and Frey 2013, 24; Rogge 2016, 9) on the pulp and paper industry too concluded 
that the EU ETS had yet to impact research for innovative technology.  
Energy sector 
However, in contrast to the study by McKinsey and Ecofys a strong impact of the EU ETS on the 
energy sectors investments in technological innovation was not directly confirmed. In the studies by 
Rogge (et al 2011, 520) and Schmidt (et al 2012, 39) a limited impact on technological innovation was 
found in the electricity sectors across Europe. However, the impact on technological innovation 
greatly varied in holding by firm size (Rogge et al 2011, 520). Rogge (et al 2011) found large German 
electricity firms in terms of emissions to have greatly improved production efficiency, as well as 
invested in research and development. Still, in 2016 Rogge concluded that operational changes were 
mostly based on GHG capture and switching of fuels, instead of structural innovative solutions 
diminishing GHG emissions (Rogge 2016, 24). The energy sector initially even invested in new 
polluting plants. 
In sum, the effect of the EU ETS on technological innovation has been minimal in the first two phases 
of the EU ETS. These results can be partially explained by the overallocation of EUAs and volatile EUA 
prices which may have created both low monetary incentives for investments in GHG abatement. 
However, differences between sectors and specifically size of firms in terms of total amount of 
verified emissions indicate existence of variable transaction costs.  
Organizational innovation 
As organizational innovation lies on the basis of technological innovation, sectoral and firm-size 
associated differences should become more clear. Moreover, organizational economics use 
transaction costs to identify the optimal governance structure: the best organizational structure to 
engage in the EU ETS with minimized transaction costs (Coggan, Stuart and Bennett 2010, 1780). Vice 
versa the organizational innovation of firms to cope with the EU ETS may provide insight in firms 
perceived transaction costs (Rogge 2016, 14).  
Knowledge 
According to Anita Engels (2009), in order to participate in the EU ETS firms will have to be able to 
answer the question: ‘What are my abatement costs?’. As the EU ETS has experienced various 
uncertainties, volatile prices and perhaps market failures due to transaction costs, the ability to 
answer this question provides a first indication of firms’ abilities to comply to and participate in the 
EU ETS (Engels 2009, 488). By asking ‘Are you familiar with your company’s costs of reducing CO2 
emissions?’ (‘yes’, ‘more or less’ or ‘no’) Engels researched the level of knowledge acquired by firms 
over the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 across four EU ETS countries (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom). For all three years one third of all respondents replied that they were not familiar 
with their own abatement costs. In contrast, the results in the United Kingdom remained stable and 
relatively positive as only 15% answered ‘no’ over the course of the three years. Engels explains 
these results by the experience gained by firms partaking in the UK ETS (Engels 2009, 492). 
Noteworthy are the results of the Netherlands: firms showed an increase in knowledge from 31% 
(2006) to 50% (2008) answering ‘yes’ and being familiar with their abatements costs.  
Sources of information 
The level of knowledge can be partially explained by the internal and external sources of information 
and expertise used by firms in creating EU ETS strategy, also studied by Engels (2009). In the first year 
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mostly state services, banks and consultancy firms were consulted, which together with 
environmental, legal and risk departments ensured understanding of the EU ETS and (legal) 
compliance. Moreover, Dutch firms heavily relied on external knowledge acquired through 
workshops where they learned how to participate in the EU ETS without having to rely on external 
sources (Engels 2009, 496). In the end of phase 1 the use of workshops, consultants and state 
information declined in the Netherlands. Consequently, the manufacturing department increased in 
importance as it possesses direct knowledge and data on emissions and technological options to 
reduce emissions (Engels 2009, 494). Therefore Engels concluded that firms seem to have gathered 
enough information to innovate their internal organization to comply to and partake in the EU ETS, 
reducing uncertainties and depending on their own knowledge structures in creating EU ETS strategy. 
The found increase in knowledge on costs of reducing CO2 emissions is mentioned as proof of this 
learning effect (Engels 2009, 495).  
Organizational structures 
However, in reviewing the establishment of internal organizational structures again differences can 
be found between sectors. As result, sectors seem to choose for a strategy of either active trading or 
compliance.  
Early studies proof initial enthusiasm of firms in establishing structures in order to prepare for the EU 
ETS. In 2005 in Germany (Kenber and Haugen 2009, 3) and Ireland (Anderson, Convery and Di Maria 
2011, 18) all firms were found creating monitoring, reporting and verification capabilities increasing 
understanding and awareness of their CO2 emissions in order to comply to the EU ETS (Kenber and 
Haugen 2009, 3). Moreover, for 46% of all Irish firms the EU ETS had already affected how 
investments in CO2 technology were analyzed increasing the likeliness of technological innovation 
(Anderson, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 18). In contrast, financial management (structures to partake 
in EUA trading, monitoring and evaluating of EUA market prices) of the EU ETS lacked similar 
development. In the study by Engels (2009) it was found that departments linked to trading and 
finance (risk, portfolio management and specialized trading floors) were barely consulted in the first 
phase of the EU ETS (Engels 2009, 465). Consequently, a study by Martin (et al 2012) covering 446 EU 
ETS firms across sectors and countries found 50% of firms not having traded any EUAs since 2005. 
Similarly, flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (JI and CDM) were barely used (Sandoff and 
Schaad 2009, 3972). 
Energy sector 
Contrary to the rest of the EU ETS, one month prior to the start of the EU ETS Cames (2010) found all, 
large, German electricity firms to already have successfully established a taskforce responsible for 
rapid implementation of the EU ETS within the firm. Moreover, a majority of the firms already 
possessed emissions strategies, and ten of the twenty-two had functioning emissions-monitoring and 
EUA price-comparison systems installed (Cames 2010, 115). In 2007 all electricity firms had such 
systems installed, and a majority even participated in risk hedging strategies (Cames 2010, 128). By 
2008 the EU ETS was considered a part of the “daily business routines”, and departments were set up 
for obtaining CO2 credits through the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol (Rogge et al 2011, 520).  
Paper sector 
In contrast, by 2010 none of the Italian paper producers researched by Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey 
(2013) had introduced independent structures for management of trading or technological 
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opportunities for emission abatements. Firms merely integrated the EU ETS in existing environmental 
systems ensuring compliance (Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey 2013, 18). Similarly, Gulbrandsen and 
Stenqvist (2013, 523) found Norwegian and Swedish paper firms managing the EU ETS on factory-
level, instead of on higher strategic levels. Just 16% of the surveyed firms developed a long-term 
strategy (Rogge 2016, 17). According to the study by Pontoglio (2010) paper and pulp firms chose a 
conservative “wait-and-see” strategy, with most respondents banking EUAs and focusing on 
compliance (Rogge 2016, 9). The effect of EUA price development was found to remain minimal. The 
study by Rogge (et al 2011, 10) confirms these findings: despite 84% of German paper and pulp firms 
appointing a department for EU ETS compliance, just 31% translated the EU ETS to operational 
changes. Besides low stringency, Rogge (2016, 20) concluded that this was also caused by 
experienced transaction costs.  
In sum, so far we found technological innovation, the main goal of the EU ETS, to be minimal across 
all sectors. However, in reviewing organizational innovation we found the energy sector rapidly 
introducing operational changes and trading EUAs from the beginning of the EU ETS. In contrast, the 
paper and pulp industry remained hesitant towards trading, instead focusing on EU ETS compliance 
and minimalizing risk. Participation in the flexible mechanisms such as the Joint Implementation and 
Clean Development Mechanism remained minimal as well, in contrast to the actively participating 
energy sectors. Energy sectors therefore seem to have been more successful in both participating in 
the EU ETS trading market as in creating organizational structures to comply to the EU ETS. The 
question is whether these differences can be explained by the size of firms and the perceived 
transaction costs in complying to and participating in the EU ETS. If so, this would indicate existence 
of variable transaction costs disproportionately affecting smaller firms. 
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Transaction costs 
Transaction costs in the EU ETS 
According to Coase (1960), Tietenberg (1985) and Matisoff (2010) transaction costs were expected to 
be merely of importance in the early stages of trading programs. Due to the international nature, size 
and complexity of the EU ETS it was expected this would result in multiple sources of transaction 
costs in its implementation phase 1 from 2005 to 2008. The great number of found transaction costs 
within the EU ETS were categorized by Frasch (2007, 49), and are found in table 2. 
Category Transaction costs 
Application - Quantification of historic 
emissions 
- Development of emission 
outlooks 
- Decision for an application rule 
- Compilation of an application 
- Where necessary, compilation of 
a benchmark 
- Verification of the application 
- Fees for annual allocation 
Implementation 
of an 
emissions 
management 
- Information, training 
- Assessment of obligation to 
participate in the EU ETS 
- Set up of organizational 
structures and assignment of 
responsibilities 
- Adaptation or purchase of 
software 
- Material costs 
Monitoring - Design of a monitoring concept 
- Implementation of an internal 
monitoring system 
- Ongoing monitoring 
 
Table 2 - Transaction costs in the EU ETS (Frasch 2007, 49) 
Variable transaction costs 
The effect and nature of transaction costs incurred by firms in the first phase of the EU ETS was 
researched by both Heindl (2012) and Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011). Heindl based his 
conclusions on two surveys with 150 respondents in Germany, gathered in 2010 (Heindl 2012, 7). 
Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria issued a survey in 2008 to 106 installations (72 firms) in Ireland, of 
which 27 firms successfully completed the survey representing 70% of the total Irish EUA allocation 
in the first phase of the EU ETS (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2010, 194).  
Firm size (number of emissions) 
As the researches by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) and Heindl (2012) reveal, firm size (in 
number of emissions) has been of influence on the amount of the total amount of transaction costs 
perceived. In Germany, total transaction costs decreased for firms which emit >1,000,000 tCO2 per 
year, implying presence of economies of scale (Heindl 2012, 1). When calculated to transaction costs 
per tCO2 (total transaction costs divided by total amount of emissions in year x) the exponential 
decrease of transaction costs is greatest at low emissions levels. For example, doubling emissions 
from 5,000 to 10,000 tCO2 results in a reduction of transaction costs per tCO2 of approximately 50% 
(Heindl 2012, 1). In a third, quantitative, research by Jaraité and Kazukauskas (2015, 595) CITL data of 
17,415 installations, of 5,800 firms, in 22 EU countries in phase 1 was reviewed on factors indicating 
Reporting - Quantification of annual emissions 
- Compilation of an emissions report 
- Verification of an emissions report 
- Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Abatement 
measures 
- Identification of abatement 
measures 
- Decision for abatement measures 
Trade - Transactions fees (exchange fees, 
broker fees, clearing) 
- Trade 
- Market observation 
Strategy - Definition of a risk strategy 
- Definition of a trade strategy 
- Defininition of an abatement 
strategy 
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transaction costs. In researching the first phase of the EU ETS Jaraité-Kazukauské and Kazukauskas 
too found “signs and significance” of variable transaction costs (2015, 583). 
Effects 
In evaluating the effect of variable transaction costs Heindl found firms taking transaction costs into 
account in complying to EU ETS regulation. Firms which emit <1,000,000 tCO2 per year are found to 
abate (slightly) more CO2 than firms with >1,000,000 tCO2 per year (Heindl 2012, 16). Similarly, 
Jaraité-Kazukauské and Kazukauskas (2015, 612) found EU ETS participants with “smaller number of 
installations” to have “less trading experience”, are “less likely to participate” and “trade lower 
quantities” of EUAs. Similar results were found by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011, 201) in 
Ireland, where the transaction costs per tCO2 of smaller firms were 18% of the EUA price, whereas 
the costs per tCO2 of large firms was less than 1%. This might explain the differences found between 
the energy- and manufacturing sectors. 
Firm size (number of employees) 
In his analysis Matisoff (2010) uses the size of firms in number of employees as explanation for these 
differences. He expects an increase in employees positively affecting the capacity and ability to make 
use of the cost-efficient mechanism of the EU ETS and ease the adaptation of flexible mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol. Large firms (>100 employees) will even be able to use the EU ETS for profit-
making purposes through speculation and trade. Small firms (<100 employees) will experience higher 
transaction costs and lack capability to actively participate and will therefore focus on satisfying 
compliance requirements (Matisoff 2010, 4).  
Phase 3 
According to Matisoff (2010) a continued existence of variable transaction costs will impede the 
development of a liquid market. Large firms which experience low transaction costs will continue to 
trade, whilst small firms experiencing high transaction costs are expected to alienate from the 
market (Matisoff 2010, 4). Heindl stressed that a market exit by smaller participants would therefore 
not be caused by competitive characteristics of the EU ETS, but by market failure and high 
transaction costs due to the “disturbing effects from environmental regulation” (Heindl 2012, 14). 
This confirms the impeding effects of variable transaction costs on market functionality, and a 
resulting welfare loss. If and how transactions costs have changed and have affected the trading 
tendency of market participants in 2016 (phase 3) will therefore form the basis of my research. 
Hypothesis 
In evaluating organizational innovation we found differences between sectors in trading tendency 
and level of internal capabilities to comply to and partake in the EU ETS. After evaluating transaction 
costs we can conclude that these differences seem to be influenced by the existence of variable 
transaction costs. In order for the EU ETS to function properly, variable transaction costs should be 
minimized. As prices remain low and volatile and the EU ETS policy design continues to change by 
e.g. the implementation of the MiFID II, uncertainties have been likely to continue to exist in 2016.  
Therefore I expect: 
1. The larger the firm, the lower the transaction costs per tCO2. 
 
2. The higher the transaction costs per tCO2, the lower the trading tendency. 
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Evaluation of categories of transaction costs 
To understand the transaction costs experienced by firms and how these might have developed, I 
review the five categories of transaction costs as formulated by Heindl (2012) and Jaraité, Convery 
and Di Maria (2011): 
1. Transaction costs stemming from early implementation; 
2. Transaction costs stemming from monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); 
3. Transaction costs stemming from the application for free allocation at national authorities; 
4. Transaction costs stemming from trading; 
5. Transaction costs stemming from examining the abatement costs in comparing technologies 
and corresponding uncertainties in related costs and results. 
Early implementation costs 
Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011, 193) expected that most of the transaction costs only incurred 
once, as firms implemented the policy. Such costs are known as ‘early implementation costs’, and 
consist of capital costs in setting up MRV systems, consultancy costs in order to understand the EU 
ETS and internal costs for e.g. additional time spent by and training of staff. Jaraité, Convery and Di 
Maria’s (2011) findings of early implementation costs are summarized in figure 5, sorted by firm size 
and expressed in total amount of EUR per firm and per ton of verified emissions in phase 1.  
 
Figure 5 - Early implementation costs per respondent, total and per ton of CO2 (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 
2010, 196) 
Total early implementation costs have been found to be exponentially higher for large firms (in terms 
of emissions) in comparison to medium and small firms, and almost five times as high as the average 
of all firms (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 194). However, when divided by the number of 
verified emissions the costs per ton of emissions of a large firm is 1/17th of that of a small firm (EUR 
0.03/tCO2 vs. EUR 0.51/tCO2). This inequity of distribution of early implementation transaction costs 
of EU ETS firms of different sizes has been raised as concern by the European Commission as well in 
2008 (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 196). Despite implementation costs only incurring once, 
the variance in equity of burden of implementation were a first indication of troubling variable 
transaction costs. 
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Monitoring, reporting and verification costs (MRV) 
In contrast to early implementation costs, MRV costs are experienced continuously. Moreover, in the 
first two phases MRV costs were found to be the greatest contributor to the total amount of 
transaction costs (Heindl 2012, 3; Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 194). The writing of emissions 
reports was considered to be time consuming, as for every individual installation data has to be 
collected and analyzed, annually. Subsequently, an independent third party has to verify the report, 
as to be finally reported at the national authorities (NEa 2017). In measuring MRV costs Jaraité, 
Convery and Di Maria (2011) make a distinction between internal and external (consultancy) costs. 
His findings are illustrated in figure 6, sorted by firm size (in emissions) and expressed in total 
amount of EUR and per ton of verified emissions in phase 1.  
 
Figure 6 - MRV costs per respondent, total and per ton of CO2 (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 198) 
Once again, MRV costs of larger firms (in terms of emissions) were found to be a fraction of MRV 
costs experienced by smaller firms per ton of CO2 emitted (EUR 1.51/tCO2 vs. EUR 0.02/tCO2), 
confirming the existence of variable transaction costs in phase 1 (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 
198). For phase 3 it is however expected that both EU and market participants will have “learned-by-
doing” (Frasch 2009, 50; Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 197), enhancing organizational 
structures and reducing transaction costs of MRV to enable compliance to the EU ETS. The first signs 
of the learning effect of market participants were confirmed by the increased knowledge of firms of 
their costs of reducing CO2 emissions as found by Engels (2009, 492): in 2008, 22.2% of the Dutch 
survey-participants were unaware of their CO2 abatement costs. In comparison, in 2006 this was still 
38%. 
As we are reaching the end of phase 3 I therefore expect: 
3. The higher the knowledge of costs of reducing CO2 emissions, the lower the perceived 
transaction costs of monitoring, reporting and verification. 
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The remaining three categories of transaction costs (free allocation, trading and examining 
abatement) pose a more complex analysis as these were found difficult to measure, and highly 
affected by market uncertainties and chosen EU ETS strategy.  
Free allocation costs 
Costs for application for free allocation include cost for lobbying, reporting and applicating for free 
allocation. However, discussion exists whether free allocation costs can be considered as transaction 
costs at all. As free allocation is voluntary, participants “basically apply for a subsidy” and therefore 
application costs should not be “considered as pure costs of transacting” (Heindl 2012, 6). Therefore 
Heindl did not examine free allocation costs in his research. However, measuring these costs does 
add to the understanding of total transaction costs perceived. In contrast to allocation in phase 1, 
free allocation in phase 3 is “dependent on highly specific product benchmarks”, making freely 
allocated EUAs scarce (Heindl 2012, 5). Firms might still consider free allocation a substitute of 
abatement and EUA trade and therefore experience transaction costs to apply for free EUAs. 
Furthermore, when product capacity has changed due to technological innovation, firms are required 
to re-evaluate their application as formulated at the start of phase three (European Commission 
2017d). This could have further affected free allocation costs and total transaction costs of the EU 
ETS. 
Trading costs 
Trading costs include the administrative costs of trading and the costs of performing a trade through 
either internal effort or external intermediaries and brokers. As trading costs depend on firms trading 
activity, these costs are considered variable by default (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 199). 
Nevertheless, it is likely that inhouse trading capabilities of firms have further affected trading costs. 
In the study by Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey (2013) Italian paper producers were found to possess low 
trading knowledge, therefore relying on external relations for market monitoring and EUA trading 
(Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey 2013, 21). In contrast, the German electricity sector has been found to act 
as an external relation itself, reaching out to smaller utilities allowing them market access (Cames 
2010, 21). Moreover, the KfW/ZEW (2011, 33) and Heindl (2012, 2) found large firms trading directly 
with other firms, or at exchanges. In contrast, smaller and medium-sized firms used intermediaries 
such as traders and banks. Sandoff and Schaad (2009, 3973) found similar results as 60% of Swedish 
paper firms used brokers, versus 36% of the energy sector. However, according to a study by Convery 
and Redmond (2007, 99) the trading fees per CO2t declined from EUR 0.10 in 2005 to EUR 0.06 in 
2006. Therefore Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011, 200) concluded that overall transaction costs 
for trading in phase 1 have not been a determining factor in firms trading tendency. Moreover, due 
to the overallocation of EUAs and low and volatile EUA prices in the first phase trading of EUAs 
remained minimal.  
However, in a study by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) out of 27 respondents, 19 firms held a 
surplus of EUAs at the end of phase 1. By asking the questions why non-trading firms did not try to 
sell the excessive EUAs, and why trading firms who also held excessive EUAs did not trade again, 
Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria were able to research whether transactions costs of trading were 
experienced as a threshold to trade the excessive EUAs. However, they concluded that zero 
respondents found transaction costs associated with trading to be a factor of influence. Instead, the 
low EUA price and choice to use EUAs for compliance have been named the reasons why firms did 
not sell a surplus (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011, 200).  
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Heindl found that for firms which did trade associated costs accounted for 20% of the total 
transaction costs experienced (Heindl 2012, 7). Heindl stressed that in the first two phases 
transaction costs for trading and information were relatively low compared to the costs for 
monitoring, reporting and verification (69% against 31%). However, at the time (2009) he expected 
the changes of phase 3 of the EU ETS to influence this balance. With the start of phase 3 in 2013, 
auctioning has become the default method for allocation of EUAs and the amount of free allocated 
EUAs has dropped. According to Heindl, therefore an “increasing number of firms, including small 
emitters, will have to purchase permits on the market, which will likely lead to increasing costs for 
transacting over time” (Heindl 2012, 16).  
Based on the expected increase in trading and continuous existence of differences in inhouse 
capacity and use of intermediaries I therefore expect: 
4. The larger the firm, the lower the perceived transaction costs of trading. 
Examining abatement costs 
The last category of transaction costs are examining abatements costs, or information costs: the 
search for technology for abatement and “general information for planning optimal abatement 
strategies” (Heindl 2012, 3). This includes information on EUA market price development. In theory, 
detected costs and efforts resulting in examining abatement costs are signs of the EU ETS leading to 
(consideration of the option of) technological innovation.  
However, in the study by Heindl (2012, 11) only 48 of the 150 firms were able to respond to the 
question if costs occurred in examining abatement. This phenomenon was explained as either costs 
did not yet occur, or were too difficult to measure (Heindl 2012, 11). Of the 48 firms which did 
experience costs, variable costs were explained by differing complexity of production processes 
(Heindl 2012, 7). For example, in contrast to electricity generation manufacturing of paper and pulp 
is a more complex industrial process resulting in higher costs for researching technological innovation 
(Matisoff 2010, 4).  
As of phase 3 EUAs will be mainly allocated based on auctioning, which might imply a greater 
incentive to spend more on research and development and technological innovation. Moreover, the 
higher EUA prices expected in phase 3 would in theory still increase the incentive to search for 
technology for abatement, which in return would increase examining abatement costs (Heindl 2012, 
11). At the time, Rogge (et al 2011, 521) shared this prediction and expected a decrease in free 
allocation and increase in regulatory burden to induce research, development and technological 
innovation for the manufacturing and industry sectors by 2020. Heindl especially expected smaller 
firms to make investments in abatement technology due to limited inhouse capabilities to develop 
technology themselves (Heindl 2012, 3). However, these expectations were based on the assumption 
of increased stringency and scarcity. EUA prices have however remained low and volatile. 
Consequently, Martin (et al 2012) found firms which expected to still being subject to the EU ETS in 
phase 3 not planning invest in technological innovation. The same result was found for the effect of 
the expected EUA prices by 2020. Instead, the expectation of a decrease in EUA allocation was found 
to positively affect technological product innovation (Martin et al 2012, 14). Therefore Rogge (et al 
2016, 23) changed her hypothesis and expected that as prices remain volatile, technological 
innovation is only affected by the certainty of an increase in regulatory burden.  
30 
 
As result, setting a hypothesis for the development of the examining abatement costs in 2016 poses 
a too complex task.  
Delegation theory 
Trading tendency and technological innovation can however also be explained by firms rationally 
choosing to either structurally trade or invest in technological innovation. In 2009, Engels concluded 
by quoting Convery, Ellerman and De Perthuis (2008, 15) in that “market efficiency depends on 
market participants’ ability to access reliable information”, adding that “this not only applies to the 
infrastructures and data provided by the European Commission, but also to the companies’ 
willingness to invest in knowing” (Engels 2009, 498). Early in 2006 the European Commission not only 
found “a lack of understanding of how to trade” but also “a reluctance to trade” by firms (Jaraité, 
Convery and Di Maria 2011, 199). According to rational choice institutionalism a ‘lack of willingness’ 
implies a self-interested amoral calculator where the costs of complying are considered too high 
versus the benefits of non-complying (Mastenbroek 2009, 4). In this case, non-compliance will be 
choosing to structurally satisfy EU ETS norms neglecting the cost efficiency opportunities of the EU 
ETS. In addition to the theory of transaction costs a second theory might therefore explain innovation 
and the trading tendency of the EU ETS: the delegation theory (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016).  
Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016, 3) acknowledge that EU ETS strategy, carbon management and trade 
offered new managerial, technical and political uncertainties to firms which were hard to account 
for. However, they cite Selznick (1996) in stating that firms are heterogeneous actors which house a 
diversity of professional identities with their own cognitive scripts, professional norms and resulting 
rationalities (Selznick 1996, 275). According to the neo-institutional theory, in case of regulatory 
uncertainty or high transaction costs firms may therefore choose to focus on finding structural 
solutions allowing compliance, instead of economic rational solutions in finding the equilibrium of 
the marginal abatement curve (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 157). Firms will therefore create 
minimum knowledge and understanding of the regulation they are confronted with and compare 
managemental solutions to find and establish internal certainty by delegating responsibility to a 
certain department (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 6).  
Unit responsible 
Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016) built their delegation theory on an observation made in the study by 
Sandoff and Schaad (2009). In 64% of the EU ETS firms in Sweden the responsibility for the EU ETS 
lied within the board room. Moreover, EUA trading was conducted by management in 41% of all 
firms. Yet only 37% of these firms introduced a reduction target for GHG emissions within their firm 
(Sandoff and Schaad 2009, 3969). This suggests that despite the fact that board members are aware 
and responsible for the EU ETS, a rational decision was made to limit attention for climate change, 
GHG abatement and innovation (Rogge 2016, 19). 
Based on the study by Engels (2009), Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016) reviewed the effect of the 
department responsible for the EU ETS within their firm. They found that as firms developed 
knowledge and understanding of the EU ETS and trading over the course of phase 1, responsibility 
was delegated from the executive board to the department which is considered most capable and/or 
efficient (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 2). It became apparent that the department responsible for 
formulating EU ETS strategy is of great importance on trading tendency (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 
2016, 10). A distinction could be made between firms which were ‘coupled’ and firms which became 
‘decoupled’. Firms which had adequate knowledge and experience with trading in the EU ETS 
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‘decoupled’ from technological knowledge and delegated responsibility towards financial 
departments such as finance, controlling or a specialized trading floor. This resulted in an increased 
trading activity and less focus on internal CO2 abatement as less technological knowledge was 
developed (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 12). In contrast, less-experienced and smaller sectors 
remained ‘coupled’ and delegated responsibility towards departments near production. This resulted 
in focus on compliance, and technological advancements and abatement instead (Lopez, Engels and 
Knoll 2016, 12). Moreover, the size (in number of employees) of firms affected the trading tendency 
too as change of unit in size (small, medium and large) increased the odds of trading by 1.3 times 
(Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 11). Therefore smaller firms seem to have rationally chosen to focus 
on compliance and CO2 abatement technology in contrast to larger firms who through experience 
choose to financialize the EU ETS.  
Supporting studies 
The delegation theory helps explaining contradicting results. For example, in the study by Gasbarro, 
Francesco and Frey (2013) it was initially concluded that Italian paper and pulp firms considered 
internal emissions reductions as main strategy. Interestingly, two firms which did however employ 
staff dedicated to EU ETS trading had a higher trading tendency (Gasbarro, Francesco and Frey 2013, 
21). In a review of cement producers by Schleich (et al 2010) similar results were found. Most cement 
producers banked EUAs and did not actively participate in trading. However, cement producers who 
had created a business unit dedicated to the EU ETS focused on EUA trading (Schleich et al 2010, 
103). In another study by Borghesi and Mortini (2016) some small firms were found to cooperate on 
international scale and delegated financial management to their headquarters which also resulted in 
an increased trading tendency (Rogge 2016, 19). 
Lopez, Engels and Knoll therefore conclude that we should be more cautious in financializing EU ETS 
strategy, as it is more than a cost-efficient calculation of uncertain effects of EUA price development 
and EUA allocation. They add that “transaction and abatement costs” “do not contain all necessary 
information needed to develop abatement strategies” (Lopez, Engels and Knoll 2016, 11). Therefore 
trading tendency may be the rational result of “professional knowledge embedded in different 
company departments” responsible for EU ETS strategy responding to high transaction costs (Lopez, 
Engels and Knoll 2016, 12). As result, firms which have been confronted with high transaction costs 
and uncertainties in the first two phases might have structurally decided to either satisfy or actively 
participate in the EU ETS market, despite design changes in phase 3 of the EU ETS. Consequently, 
Lopez advised to add the review of the nature of the knowledge of the people in charge of the EU 
ETS to the “traditional sources of transaction costs which are bureaucratic and trade-related” (Lopez, 
Engels and Knoll 2016, 12).  
Therefore I expect:  
5. The more coupled the department responsible for the EU ETS, the lower the trading 
tendency.  
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2.6 Hypotheses 
In evaluating the institutional design of the EU ETS we learned that due to incomplete structures, 
numerous design changes and setbacks, firms were confronted with various uncertainties. In order to 
evaluate whether these uncertainties led to transaction costs and affected firms in reaching the goals 
of the EU ETS in reducing GHG emissions we made a distinction between technological and 
organizational innovation. We found that technological innovation remained minimal mostly due to 
the lack of stringency caused by low EUA prices and overallocation of EUAs. However, hints were 
found of technological innovation varying across sectors, with the energy sector innovating more 
than manufacturing and industry sectors. In reviewing the organizational innovation these 
differences became more distinct. Large firms in the energy sector succeeded early on in adapting 
MRV-instruments, trading, and even partaking in risk hedging strategies. In contrast, smaller and 
more complex sectors (e.g. paper and pulp) fell behind and did not partake in trading, instead 
banking EUAs and focusing on compliance. 
In evaluating the presence and effect of transaction costs in the EU ETS we learned that firms have 
experienced great transaction costs for e.g. compliance by MRV. Moreover, several writers found 
‘signs and significance’ of variable transaction costs in the first phase of the EU ETS. These were 
found to disproportionately affect the capacity and ability of smaller firms to comply to the EU ETS, 
and reduced trading tendency. As result, this may have affected the cost-efficient mechanism of the 
EU ETS and led to a welfare loss. The existence of variable transaction explains the differences in 
organizational and technological innovation found between sectors.  
In this thesis I study the effect of the size of firms on transaction costs of the EU ETS and trading 
tendency in the Netherlands in 2016. Based on the literature review I set five hypotheses: 
1. The larger the firm, the lower the transaction costs per tCO2 
2. The higher the transaction costs per tCO2, the lower the trading tendency 
3. The higher the knowledge of costs of reducing CO2 emissions, the lower the perceived 
transaction costs of monitoring, reporting and verification 
4. The larger the firm, the lower the perceived transaction costs of trading 
5. The more coupled the department responsible for the EU ETS, the lower the trading 
tendency 
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3. Research Design 
 
Due to a lack of existing studies researching transaction costs or organizational innovation in the 
Netherlands, no existing datasets were available to study the research question and test the 
hypotheses. Therefore, a new survey was designed and issued to create a new dataset. The survey 
issued is based on a combination of the research by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) on 
transaction costs in Ireland, and the research by Engels (2009) and Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016) on 
organizational innovation and the delegation effect of market participants (in Germany, United 
Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands). Questions were retrieved from both questionnaires to 
enable study of the hypotheses, and edited to be used in the Qualtrics Software. 151 Firms were 
contacted to participate in the survey. 
In the following section ‘Concepts, Operationalization & Methodology’ the operationalization of 
variables are defined in order to test the hypotheses and answer the research question. In the 
section following the process of case selection will be explained, followed by a section evaluating the 
data gathering process. To address possible validity threats this chapter will end with a discussion of 
the limitations of the sample and adjustments made to the data. 
3.1 Concepts, Operationalization & Methodology 
In this study five hypotheses are tested. In order to study these hypotheses, five concepts have to be 
defined and operationalized:  
1. Transaction costs (Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4) 
2. Firm size (Hypotheses 1, 4) 
3. Trading tendency (Hypotheses 2, 5) 
4. Knowledge (Hypothesis 3) 
5. Distance to the board (Hypothesis 5) 
At the end of this section table 4 provides an overview of the concepts, operationalization and 
variables. On the page following table 5 summarizes the variables used for each hypothesis, 
accompanied by the statistical test used.  
Transaction costs 
Definition 
The main goal is to identify transaction costs experienced by firms in the Netherlands in 2016. A first 
indication of the existence of transaction costs is provided by asking the question where firms in 
2016 saw the most important uncertainties in emissions trading (Q41). However, what transactions 
costs are and how we should measure them are considered to be two prominent challenges in 
institutional economics. As multiple theoretical understandings of transaction cost exist, methods of 
measurements and empirical work are rather heterogeneous (Wang 2003, 2). To ensure 
comprehension and respondents taking into account the correct transaction costs associated with 
the EU ETS (thus: validity), the transaction costs were introduced and clearly defined in the 
questionnaire based on Heindl’s (2012) four categories of transaction costs in the EU ETS: 1. 
Measuring, reporting and verification costs (MRV), 2. Application for free allocation costs. 3. Trading 
costs, 4. Information costs (for abatement and strategy building) (see questionnaire in appendix B for 
definitions). This increases the validity and reliability of the results and allows comparison with 
existing research on transaction costs in the EU ETS.  
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Measurement 
In order to test hypothesis 1 and 2, I have to be able to calculate the (economic) transaction costs per 
tCO2. In order to test hypothesis 3 and 4, I have to able to evaluate transaction costs for the 
categories MRV and trading. 
Transaction costs per tCO2 
In order to measure transaction costs per tCO2 I first have to calculate total transaction costs. In 
order to do so I used questions from the questionnaire of Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) and 
the method by Heindl (2012) by making a distinction between internal and external costs. In order to 
calculate internal costs, respondents were asked for the number of employees involved (Q28_A) and 
estimated percentage of time spent (Q28_B) on the EU ETS. By multiplying one day by eight working 
hours and the average gross income per hour in the private sector (estimated and set at 30 EUR; CBS 
2014) I was able to calculate the internal transaction costs using the same method as Heindl (2012, 
7). Subsequently, firms were asked to recall and tick external organizations which provided advice 
and/or support (Q31). This helped them in making an estimation of the total external costs spent in 
2016 (Q33). By summing internal and external costs the total transaction costs were derived. I 
hereafter divided total transaction costs by firm size in terms of emissions (see Firm size, below). This 
results in the variable transaction costs per tCO2. 
Evaluation of categories 
In order to evaluate the nature of the transaction costs and in order to test hypotheses 3 and 4 I 
asked respondents to estimate the percentage of time spent internally (Q30) and money spent 
externally (Q32) for each category of transaction costs. Additionally respondents were asked to 
evaluate the perceived transaction costs for the four categories on a (ordinal) Likert five-point-scale 
of ‘very high’ to ‘very low’ (Q11, MRV; Q15, free allocation; Q25, trading; Q14, information). 
Specifically for hypothesis 4 I also asked firms to indicate their trading method (Q20, ‘Directly, 
without a third party’; ‘Indirectly, via a third party’) and the reason(s) why they chose this method 
(Q21; Q22). This provides an indication of the inhouse capability of firms for trading EUAs, and 
trading costs.  
Firm size 
Emissions 
In order to test hypothesis 1 and research the existence of variable transaction costs, the variables 
firm size and transaction costs per tCO2 have to be created. However, studies evaluating transaction 
costs differ in how they operationalized ‘firm size’: either in total amount of verified emissions or in 
number of employees.  
To calculate transaction costs per tCO2 I made use of the definition using the total verified amount of 
tons of CO2 (tCO2) emitted by each participant in year x. These numbers are available through the 
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) of the EU ETS. To ensure firms’ transaction costs 
correspond with the correct amount of verified emissions, the survey asked firms how many 
installations they would refer to (Q8). This results in the variable firm size in emissions. By dividing 
the variable total transaction costs by the firm size in emissions the variable transaction costs per 
tCO2 is derived: the costs experienced for emitting one ton of CO2. By comparing transaction costs 
per tCO2 with firm size in emissions hypothesis 1 can be tested. In addition firm size in emissions will 
be used to test hypothesis 4.  
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Employees 
The second definition of firm size is based on the number of employees. Matisoff (2010, 4) expects 
firm size in number of employees to explain experience, capabilities, and transaction costs of firms in 
participating in the EU ETS. To ensure validity of results, this definition of firm size is used as test in 
hypothesis 1 and 4. Similar to the study by Engels (2009), my survey asked firms (Q3) to choose 
between ‘Small (>49)’, ‘Medium-sized (50-249)’ and ‘Large (250>)’ resulting in the (ordinal) variable 
firm size in employees.  
Trading tendency 
In order to test hypothesis 2 I operationalize trading tendency, defining the activity of respondents 
on the EU ETS market. As information on trading activity of companies is sensitive (as it may affect 
market prices), actual trading data is held confidential by the EU for four years and is therefore not 
available for my research. In order to operationalize trading tendency I therefore combined the 
methods by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) and Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016, 6) resulting in 
three individual variables: 1. Did you trade?, 2. Frequency and 3. Sell/buy. The first (nominal) variable 
is based on the question if respondents have traded in the 2016 (Q16: ‘yes’; ‘no’ ). Second, 
respondents were asked how often they have traded in 2016 to give us an understanding of their 
amount of trading activity (ordinal) (Q18: ‘Daily’; ‘Weekly’; ‘Monthly’; ‘Quarterly’; ‘Semi-annually’; 
‘Annually’; ‘Other’). Lastly, and more complex, participants will be posed the question how they 
would define their trading activity on a (ordinal) Likert five-point-scale from ‘only selling’ to ‘only 
buying’ (Q17). Firms with high transaction costs are expected to merely buy EUAs to ensure 
compliance and bank excessive EUAs rather than selling them on the EU ETS market (Jaraité-
Kazukauské and Kazukauskas 2015, 588). Therefore selling activity is considered an indicator of a 
higher trading tendency (Rogge 2016, 9). 
Knowledge 
For hypothesis 3 the level of knowledge within firms on their abatement costs has to be defined. 
Here I replicated the method used by Anita Engels (2009, 488) by asking respondents ‘Are you 
familiar with your company’s costs of reducing CO2 emissions?’ (‘Yes’; ‘More or less’; ‘No’) (Q13). At 
a glance, this (ordinal) variable does not seem to provide information of the capabilities of firms to 
participate in the EU ETS. However, as this question lies on the basis of EU ETS strategy formulation it 
is considered “a simple but meaningful indicator” of firms overall knowledge (Engels 2009, 492).  
Distance to the board 
The fifth and last concept is the distance to the board. Organizational innovation defines how and to 
what extent participants innovated their firm in order to incorporate the regulation of the EU ETS. 
Based on the ‘delegation theory’, the (ordinal) variable distance to the board expresses how the 
executive level of the participating firm has interpreted and delegated responsibility of the EU ETS. In 
the survey I measured the distance by asking the question ‘In 2016, which unit in your company was 
responsible for the decision making on emissions trading?’ (Q26). Participants could choose from the 
same ten departments as offered in the questionnaire by Engels (2009) and Lopez, Engels and Knoll 
(2016). All departments are scaled from -2 to +2, where a positive number represents a decoupled 
effect. Table 3 provides an overview of units and their distance to the board.  
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Distance to  
board 
Scale Unit 
Decoupled -2.0 Portfolio management, specialized trading floor, outsourcing 
 -1.0 Environmental department 
 0.0 Executive board 
 1.0 Controlling & risk management 
Coupled 2.0 Manufacturing 
Table 3 – Coding of Q26 to variable Distance to board 
By comparing the distance to the board with trading tendency hypothesis 5 can be tested. 
In addition, three indicators related to the delegation theory will be used to test whether the 
delegation theory does stand ground. These include the variable knowledge (Q13), technological 
innovation (Q37: ‘In 2016, did your firm invest in technological solutions in order to reduce CO2 
emissions?’) and firm size employees (Q3). 
For an overview of the operationalization of all five concepts, see table 4 on the following page. For 
an overview of all questions asked, see appendix B: ‘Questionnaire’.  
Methodology 
In order to test the hypotheses six statistical tests have been used: Non-Linear Regression (curve-
estimation), One-Way ANOVA, Logistic Regression, Spearman Rank-Order Correlation, Kruskal-Wallis 
H and Chi-square (Fisher-Freeman-Halton) exact. The choice for each statistical test is based on the 
type of variables (e.g. continuous, nominal or ordinal), number of respondents and normality of the 
independent variable. For example, I expect a non-linear decrease of transaction costs per tCO2 as 
firms increase in firm size in emissions. Both variables are continuous, therefore I use a non-linear 
regression. In contrast, an One-Way ANOVA test the relationship of the means of e.g. transaction 
costs per category (ordinal) firm and knowledge (ordinal). In testing the relationships described in my 
hypotheses I used a significance level of α 0.05. I therefore either reject or accept (depends on 
statistical test used) hypotheses with a statistical significant relationship of p < 0.05. Table 5 provides 
an overview of the variables used for each hypothesis and the statistical test used.  
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 Concepts Operationalization Variables 
1 
Transaction 
costs 
Per tCO2 
 
Internal  
Q28_A (#employees EU ETS)*Q28_B 
(%time spent internally on EU ETS)*8 
hours* EUR 30 
Internal + External = Total 
transaction costs/Firms size 
emissions = 
Transaction costs per tCO2 (EUR) 
External Q33 (EUR spent on EU ETS externally) 
Per 
category 
Perceived burden 
 
Q11 (MRV) (Likert five-point-scale) = Evaluation MRV  
Q15 (Free allocation) (Likert five-point-scale) = Evaluation Free allocation 
Q25 (Trading) (Likert five-point-scale) = Evaluation Trading 
Q14 (Information) (Likert five-point-scale) = Evaluation Information 
Money spent 
Internal costs*Q30 (%internally per category) + External costs*Q32 
(%externally per category) = 
Transaction costs per category (EUR) 
Extra 
Uncertainties Q41 (Perceived uncertainties) =  Uncertainties 
Inhouse capacity 
Q20 (Trading method, ‘directly, without a third party’; ‘indirectly, via a third 
party’ + Q21/Q22 (Reason why) =  
Inhouse capacity 
2 Firm size 
Emissions Q8 (#installations)  CITL data = Firm size in emissions 
Employees Q3 (#employees company, 1: small; 2: medium; 3: large) = Firm size in employees 
3 
Trading 
tendency 
Trade (yes/no) Q16 (Did you trade?, ‘yes’; ‘no’) =  Trading tendency (1. Did you trade) 
Frequency  
Q18 (Frequency, ‘daily’; ‘weekly’; ‘quarterly’; ‘semi-annually’; ‘annually’; ‘ad 
hoc’) = 
Trading tendency (2. Frequency) 
Sell/buy Q17 (Sell/buy) (Likert five-point scale) = Trading tendency (3. Sell/buy) 
4 Knowledge 
Knowledge of costs reducing 
CO2 
Q13 (familiar with costs?, ‘yes’; ‘no’) = 
Knowledge 
5 
Distance to the 
board 
Coupled/decoupled Q26 (unit responsible for EU ETS?)  recoded =  Distance to board 
Extra 
Technological 
innovation 
Q37 (investment in technological innovation?, ‘yes’; ‘no’) =  
Technological innovation 
Table 4 – Operationalization of concepts to variables
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 Hypotheses Variables Statistical tests 
1 
The larger the firm, the lower the transaction costs per tCO2 
 
Firm size emissions vs. Transaction costs per 
tCO2 
Non-linear Regression (curve-
estimation) 
Firm size employees vs. Transaction costs per 
tCO2 
One-Way ANOVA 
2 
The higher the transaction costs per tCO2, the lower the trading tendency 
 
Transaction costs per 
tCO2 vs. 
Trading tendency 
(1. Did you trade) 
(yes/no) 
Logistic Regression 
Trading tendency 
(2. Frequency) Spearman Rank-Order 
Correlation Trading tendency (3. 
Sell/buy) 
3 
The higher the knowledge of costs of reducing CO2 emissions, the lower the 
perceived transaction costs of monitoring, reporting and verification 
Knowledge vs. 
Evaluation MRV 
transaction costs 
Kruskal-Wallis H 
MRV transaction costs 
per tCO2 
One-Way ANOVA 
4 
The larger the firm, the lower the perceived transaction costs of trading 
 
 
Firm size employees vs. 
Evaluation trading transaction costs 
Kruskal-Wallis H 
Firm size emissions vs. 
Evaluation trading transaction costs 
Spearman Rank-Order 
Correlation 
5 
The more coupled the department responsible for the EU ETS, the lower the trading 
tendency 
Distance to the board 
vs. 
Trading tendency 
(1. Did you trade) 
(yes/no) 
Chi-Square (Fisher-Freeman-
Halton exact) test 
Trading tendency 
(2. Frequency) 
Kruskal-Wallis H 
Trading tendency 
(3. Sell/buy) 
Kruskal-Wallis H 
Table 5 – Variables used for each hypothesis, accompanied by statistical tests
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3.2 Case selection  
Since contacting all 11,000 firms under the EU ETS across 31 countries is rather time intensive, a 
choice had to be made on which firms I would approach. Moreover, we learned that in comparing 
firms from different member states it is important to account for differences in e.g. legislation and 
economy. However, as the Netherlands encompasses roughly 450 firms under the EU ETS, a useful 
sample should in theory be able to be deducted from this country alone. Furthermore, as the NEa 
and AFM confronted me with their information deficit and inadequate comprehension of strategy 
formulation of Dutch firms under the EU ETS, I was convinced of the necessity of EU ETS evaluation 
focusing on the Netherlands. In this section I will discuss the process, choices made and validity and 
reliability in selecting cases in the Netherlands for this study.  
The Netherlands 
The 450 firms in the Netherlands obliged to reduce emissions under the EU ETS together are 
responsible for 45% of the Dutch GHG emissions. Similar to other EU-member states a small group of 
firms (10%) is responsible for the largest share of emissions in the in the Netherlands (84%) (NEa 
2016, 9). In figure 7, the contribution in percentages of the four biggest sectors for the total 
emissions in the Netherlands are illustrated. The sector responsible for the production of electricity 
and gas, steam and hot water supply is the greatest contributor, responsible for 51.4 Mton or 50% of 
the CO2 emissions in the EU ETS. The chemical, oil and basic metals sectors can be found at less than 
halve of the emissions of the energy sector at approximately 20%, 12% and 7%. The remaining 11% 
of emissions are mainly produced in the sectors food products and beverages, paper and pulp 
production, non-metallic mineral products or small companies in varying sectors (NEa 2016, 9).  
 
Figure 7 – CO2 emissions four biggest sectors in the Netherlands, 2013-2015 (NEa 2017, 9) 
Sample size 
In order to represent the population, a diverse and great N of respondents is needed. In comparing 
previous studies on transaction costs the size of the N differs. The study by Jaraité, Convery and Di 
Maria (2011) on transaction costs in Ireland, which is used as basis of this study, based their 
conclusions on just 27 firms (40% out of all 68 EU ETS firms in Ireland) (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 
2011, 212). In comparison, Heindl (2012, 11) based his findings on a pooled sample of 150 
respondents in Germany. Other studies which merely focused on technological and organizational 
innovation in specific sectors mostly based their findings on interviews (Cames 2010, 22 interviews; 
Rogge et al 2011, 19 interviews). Studies which did succeed in creating a great N issued surveys 
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across countries and sectors for months or even years (Engels 2009, 100 firms, three successive 
years). Due to the constraint of time it is not realistic to reach a comparable quantity of respondents. 
However, as this study is mainly based on the study by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011) I did set 
a minimum of 25 respondents to ensure reliability of results.  
Selection process 
In the CITL database a list was deducted providing all names of installations in the EU ETS in the 
Netherlands and their verified emissions in 2016. The CITL does however not include information on 
sector (NACE code) or owner of each installation account. This complexified contacting firms and 
deducting their total amount of verified emissions as needed to create the variable size in tCO2. 
Moreover, as I did this research on my own, time and capacity to contact every one of the 470 open 
accounts was limited. Additionally, as previous research on EU ETS evaluation in the Netherlands is 
scarce, no indication existed of sectors in the Netherlands which could prove for promising results. 
Besides, this would result in selection bias in choosing respondents. Based on the studies by e.g. 
Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey (2013) or Schmidt (et al 2012) I could have focused on either the paper or 
the electricity sector. This would however require sufficient participation from both sectors, or 
additional interviews to create full understanding of their position. This would be time intensive for 
firms lowering the chances of participation. 
Taking these barriers into account, as well as the academic relevance and necessity of a broad 
research on the evaluation of the EU ETS in the Netherlands, I have chosen to contact all Dutch 
installations in the CITL. First and foremost this will provide a broad insight in the perceived 
transaction costs across sectors and firms which vary in size in total amount of employees as well as 
amount of CO2 emitted. Although it is unlikely I will reach a 100% representative sample of all firms 
and sectors in the Netherlands, comparing results based on firm size in verified emissions and testing 
the hypotheses can provide a first indication to be used as basis for future research on the EU ETS 
evaluation and transaction costs in the Netherlands. 
In contacting firms I have pursued equal perseverance in succeeding in making various sectors 
participate in this study. All sectors have been at least contacted once. One firm was selected based 
on his contribution in designing the survey. This made the firm more likely to partake in the research. 
There has been no reason to exclude firms in taking part in the study.  
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3.3 Data gathering  
Over the course of four weeks I successfully contacted 151 firms. Out of the 151 firms, 108 agreed on 
receiving the survey. This resulted in 39 respondents, which is a 36% response rate. The 39 firms 
represent 70 (15%) of the 470 installations in the EU ETS in the Netherlands. Of the 69 firms which 
did not complete the survey, only three firms explicitly denied participation. The remaining 66 did 
not respond, despite initial enthusiasm.  
The process of issuing the survey started by contacting firms by calling their general phone number 
as found on their website or Google. I would then ask for the individual or department responsible 
for the EU ETS. When connected through to the right person, I would explain the nature of the 
research as evaluating the EU ETS in the Netherlands. After receiving a personal e-mail address, I 
send the survey accompanied by an introduction of the research goal and information on the length 
and confidentially of the survey to the respondent. Additionally all respondents were promised a 
summary of the results as thank you.  
Difficulties 
In acquiring respondents, three difficulties were found important to be taking into account: 1. The 
complexity of the subject, 2. The commercial nature of firms, 3. The sentiment associated with the 
subject.  
Complexity 
First, the complexity of the subject of the EU ETS appeared to be a threshold. Although the process of 
calling 151 firms was time consuming, I expected the alternative of e-mailing the survey to the e-mail 
addresses of front desks of firms to be less successful. The EU ETS is a very specific regulation, 
therefore the use of jargon such as EUAs and transaction costs might hinder the survey-invitation 
successfully reaching the correct individuals. In contacting firms this expectation was confirmed as 
receptionists often struggled in connecting me through to the correct person. Especially in larger 
firms with more than 250 employees, finding the right individual resulted in several phone calls, 
often still without success. In some occasions this even lead to receptionist becoming frustrated, as 
they remained unsuccessful in connecting me through. Perhaps my perseverance in redialing firms 
several times over the course of the four weeks added to this frustration. In one case this led to a 
firm incorrectly denying participation in the EU ETS. Contrary, in the case of small or medium sized 
firms I was often connected through directly to the correct individual, or towards the CEO or financial 
manager who offered to forward my survey.  
Additionally I contacted and used the advice of a brick manufacturer in designing the survey, testing 
the use of jargon and adjusting questions to ensure minimal complexity and maximal response rate. 
Commercial nature 
Second, the commercial nature of the firms resulted in two thresholds: 1. Time and 2. Value of 
information.  
Taking part in a survey requires time which was found to be scarce. In designing the survey I 
therefore tried to shorten the survey as much as possible, without losing validity of results. In order 
to ease the process of filling in the survey I mainly used multiple choice questions. This resulted in a 
survey which, according to the Qualtrics software, could be filled in within ten minutes. This length 
was appreciated, as firms often asked for the length of the survey before promising participation. In 
addition respondents received two reminders: one a week after the survey invitation, mentioning the 
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deadline for participation, and one early in the morning on the day of the deadline. Especially the last 
reminder had a great effect, resulting in an additional nine respondents. This shows that rather than 
unwillingness to participate, the survey invitation had escaped the attention of the respondents due 
to a lack of time.  
The second threshold associated with the commercial nature of the firms is the value of firms’ 
information. I anticipated firms’ strategy, trading behavior and organization structures to be 
considered competitive sensitive information. Therefore I promised confidentiality of results, 
avoiding competitive sensitive questions and referring to respondents based on their sector. In 
contacting firms the necessity of confidentiality was confirmed as several firms explicitly mentioned 
confidentially as absolute precondition for their willingness to take part in the study.  
Sentiment 
Lastly, the sentiment associated with the EU ETS appeared to be a threshold. The initial plan was to 
cooperate with the NEa and/or AFM in spreading the survey across firms, expecting that being able 
to name the support of these institutions would increase the response rate. However, the NEa 
wanted to ensure impartiality as monitoring institution and decided not to cooperate in issuing the 
survey. In contrast, the AFM did not explicitly decide not to cooperate, but as the opposite wasn’t 
explicitly pledged either I decided to issue the survey independently.  
In contrast to what I expected, the independent nature of this research encouraged firms to 
participate and be more open on the functionality of the EU ETS. In some phone calls frustrations in 
complying to the EU ETS regulation resulted in rather intense emotions regarding the monitoring 
activities of the NEa. One firm therefore decided not to fill in the survey, but did however share his 
full (negative) experience with the EU ETS and NEa on the phone. In another phone call a respondent 
felt reassured as I confirmed I did not issue this research on behalf of the NEa. In one case, I 
contacted a firm which was in the midst of an onsite inspection associated with EU ETS compliance. 
Whilst laughing he reassured that the inspection provided “plenty of relevant experience” to address 
questions regarding EU ETS evaluation. Whilst these frustrations and emotions may be a healthy, 
perhaps even cynical, aversion against monitoring agencies, this does not have to be the case. In 
aforementioned phone calls respondents proclaimed their support for all attempts to induce 
technological innovations and CO2 abatement, whilst simultaneously criticizing the burden and 
functionality of the EU ETS. 
In sum, the factors which seem to have added to the response rate are perseverance and time spent 
in reaching and reminding the correct individuals within each firm and optimizing the survey in 
length and wording to ensure maximum results. Moreover, respondents were found to appreciate 
confidentiality, the independent nature of research and were enthused by the research goal. Despite 
some firms explicitly mentioning firm policy as reason to not participate, most firms which were 
issued the survey seem to have not responded as they did not found the time or motivation to 
partake. Here, the nature of the research as part of a master thesis might have been a factor of 
influence. 
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3.4 Limitations & adjustments 
Similar to former studies, the results of this study has limitations in the degree to which results can 
be generalized. In this section I discuss the generalizability and limitations in reliability and validity of 
the sample.  
Limitations 
In figure 8 the firms of both the total population and the sample are grouped by total verified 
emissions. The y-axis shows the distribution of groups in percentage. As we can see, the sample 
roughly matches the total population. However, I do miss respondents which emit more than 
500,000 tCO2. Therefore the result of T-test using the mean of the total population shows a 
significant difference between the sample and the population, t (38) = -11,201, p = 0.000. Similar to 
the population, the sample does not show a normal distribution, SW= 0.678, df = 39, p= 0.000.  
Nevertheless, the great majority of the population emits less than 500,000 tCO2 (91.1%) and the 
sample has respondents for all other groups. Similarly, the sample offers variety in firm size in 
number of employees as 7 of the 39 respondents are considered a small firm (up to 49 employees), 
17 of the 39 firms are medium-sized (50-259 employees) and 15 firms are large firms (250> 
employees). Contrary, the variety in sectors is limited as 35 of the 39 respondents are in the 
manufacturing sector. For more information on nature of the respondents see appendix A. Based on 
the minimum of respondents set at N = 25 and the goal of finding signs indicating presence of 
variable transaction costs, I therefore conclude that I am able to generalize results for the variable 
firm size in number of verified emissions in testing variable transaction costs. 
 
Figure 8 - Population vs. Sample in terms of emissions in 2016 
Still, some limitations in the research design should be held into account. For example, in issuing 
surveys the sampling procedure is based on willingness to participate (response bias). Firms with 
frustrations regarding the EU ETS might have been more induced to participate in this study than 
other firms. Therefore the external validity of the sample cannot be guaranteed (Jaraité, Convery and 
Di Maria 2011, 195). Additionally, I had to trust respondents in reading the questions correctly, taking 
enough time to ensure understanding and answering appropriately. As I had to contact several 
respondents to adjust obvious errors, it is likely some less obvious errors have remained unadjusted 
in the data.  
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Adjustments 
Four adjustments had to be made. First, thirteen answers of firms on the number of installations did 
not match with the number of accounts in the CITL. After contacting these respondents it appeared 
that nine respondents had confused the number of installations in the CITL with the number of 
turbines onsite. One firm mentioned an installation which existed, but which account was closed in 
2015. Only three firms actually had additional installations which did not match their firm name. 
These were added to their total amount of verified emissions. 
Secondly, for calculating internal transaction costs an extra question was added asking for an 
estimation of the overall full-time working days spent on the EU ETS to compare with my own 
calculations. Here, three responses were adjusted to use the data provided by the control variable 
based on overall full-time workings days as values differed more than EUR 1. For example, based on 
calculating the number of employees and time spent, one respondents’ estimation of number of full-
time working days differed +-280 days with my calculation.  
Thirdly, two firms added the total worth of EUAs bought in 2016 to their total transaction costs. 
Therefore these two firms became outliers in transaction costs per tCO2, distorting the analyses. In 
the statistical analyses using the variable transaction costs per tCO2 (or costs of transaction costs 
category x per tCO2) these two outliers have therefore been excluded.  
Lastly, the analysis was partially limited due to a mistake in coding the web survey. One question 
asking firms if they hold an excess of EUAs was only asked to firms which traded EUAs in 2016. Firms 
which did not trade EUAs could not answer this question, limiting the options interpreting the effect 
of trading costs. Additionally, in researching the effect of knowledge of abatement costs on 
transaction costs of MRV I merely used a ‘yes’, ‘more or less’, ‘no’ question in measuring knowledge. 
As this hypothesis is based on the theory of learning effects, a question asking how many years the 
respondent is part of the EU ETS might have added to the understanding of the level of gained 
experience.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Findings 
Before testing the hypotheses, I will first provide a brief overview of the data collected and important 
variables.  
In phase 1 and 2 transaction costs in the EU ETS were the result of uncertainties due to unclear rules, 
continuous adjustments to the institutional design, insecure abatement targets, complex MRV 
requirements and price volatility (Matisoff 2010, 4). A first indicator of transaction costs in the 
Netherlands in 2016 can therefore be found in the answer on the question ‘Where do you currently 
see the most important uncertainties in emissions trading?’. This results in table 6, below.  
Uncertainties N 
Long-term price development  24 
Regulatory changes 22 
Intransparency of the process of policy-making 20 
Technological innovations 7 
Strategies of market participants 6 
Short-term price volatility 6 
Total 85 
Table 6 – Frequency table of named uncertainties in the EU ETS in 2016 
In 2016, firms still seem to experience a great number of uncertainties, predominantly caused by 
price volatility, regulatory changes and intransparency of the process of policy-making. 
Consequently, in calculating total transaction costs I found that the firms in the sample (outliers 
excluded, N = 37) on average experienced EUR 20,871 of transaction costs (SD = 34,408) or EUR 0.88 
per tCO2 (SD = 1.06). In figure 6 these costs are divided by the percentage of costs spent on the EU 
ETS for the categories ‘Monitoring, reporting and verification’, ‘Application for free allocation’, 
‘Trading’ and ‘Informational costs’ to total 100%. In addition, the evaluation of costs of each category 
ranking from very low to very high is illustrated in figure 7, providing a better understanding of firms’ 
individual evaluation of transaction costs.  
 
Figure 6 - Percentages of time/money spent per category of transaction costs in 2016 
68.7% 10.9% 11.2% 9.2% 
0% 100% 
Transaction costs in the EU ETS 2016 
MRV Free Allocation Trading Information 
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 Figure 7 – Evaluation per category of transaction costs in 2016 
Immediately it can be concluded that the greatest transaction costs occurred for compliance through 
monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions (MRV) at 68.7%. The remainder of transaction 
costs are relatively equally spread across the other three categories: 10.0% for free allocation, 11.2% 
for trading and 9.2% for information costs. In addition, as information costs are signs of the EU ETS 
leading to (consideration of the option of) technological innovation, this indicates that firms despite 
ongoing uncertainties and transaction costs have invested in innovation. This is confirmed by the 
question ‘In 2016, did you your firm invest in technological solutions in order to reduce CO2 
emissions?’, where a striking 30 out of 39 firms answered ‘yes’. However, firms’ evaluation of the 
four categories greatly varied per category, indicating possibility of variable transaction costs. 
Moreover, in evaluating trading tendency I find that merely 17 of the 39 respondents traded EUAs in 
2016. The question is if this can be explained by variable transaction costs.  
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4.2 Variable transaction costs 
Due to the use of two definitions of firm size in literature on variable transaction costs in the EU ETS I 
test hypothesis 1 (‘The larger the firm, the lower the transaction costs per tCO2’) both for size in 
number of emissions (Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria 2011; Heindl 2012) as for number of employees 
(Matisoff 2010). In order to do so I calculated the total amount of transaction costs and divided this 
number by the total number of verified emissions in tCO2 in 2016. This resulted in the perceived 
economic burden of transaction costs per tCO2 of each firm. 
Size in terms of emissions 
In figure 8, a scatter plot illustrates the increase in size in verified emissions on the x-axis with the 
transaction costs per tCO2 on the y-axis. Two (orange) outliers (x = 142,560, x = 242,452) are visible. 
These are caused by a misinterpretation of the question(s) on external costs (Q32, Q33) where the 
worth of bought EUAs was added to the total external costs and are therefore excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
Figure 8 –Transaction costs per tCO2 sorted by total amount of verified emissions in 2016 (orange: outliers) 
As we can see, transaction costs per tCO2 tend to decrease in a non-linear, exponential fashion as 
firms increase in size in total verified emissions. For example, firms with >50,000 tons of emissions 
had a cost of EUR 0.16 per tCO2 (N = 11, SD = 0.16), whereas firms with <50,000 tons of emissions 
experienced more than seven times as much: EUR 1.19 per tCO2 (N = 26, SD = 1.24). Moreover, firms 
with <10,000 emissions experienced EUR 1.50 per tCO2 (N=8, SD=0.70). Using a non-linear regression 
analysis (curve-estimation, power equation) the relationship between both variables was calculated 
and illustrated in figure 8 using a red dotted line. Here I find a statistically significant exponential 
decrease with a reasonable fit, R2 = 0.434, = -0.817, F(1,35) = 26.851, p = 0.000.  
  
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
2 
2,5 
3 
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 
€
/t
C
O
2
 
Firm size in total verified emissions 
Transaction costs/tCO2 vs. Emissions 
48 
 
Size in terms of employees 
In order to test whether transaction costs per tCO2 can also be explained by number of employees, I 
plotted the means of transaction costs per size in number of employees. The results are illustrated in 
figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 – Firm size in terms of employees versus transaction costs per tCO2 in 2016 (outliers excluded) 
Based on figure 9 we can see that transaction costs per tCO2 tend to be only slightly higher for small 
firms. Small firms have spent EUR 1.09 per tCO2 (N = 7, SD = 1.10), whereas medium sized and larger 
firms spent EUR 0.74 (N = 16, SD = 0.95) and EUR 0.93 (N = 14, SD = 0.93). Yet, using a one-way 
ANOVA test I find that these results are not significant, F(2, 34) = 0.290, p = 0.568. Additionally, the 
sample also included four firms with relative low amount of verified emissions (<15,000 tCO2) whilst 
being a large firm in terms of employees. In Matisoff’s theory (2010), these firms should have 
experienced lower transaction costs due to their inhouse capabilities and knowledge. However, in 
comparing their transaction costs per tCO2 with small firms in terms of employees with emissions 
<15,000 tCO2 no advantage was found (<15k/>250 employees: N = 4, M = EUR 1.69, SD = 1.00); 
<15k/<100 employees: N = 5, M = EUR 1.40, SD = 1.16). This supports my conclusion in disconfirming 
an effect of firm size in employees on transaction costs per tCO2.  
Based on these results I only accept hypothesis 1 with firm size in terms of verified emissions leading 
to lower transaction costs per tCO2. As result, variable transaction costs and therefore economies of 
scale are proven to exist in the EU ETS in the Netherlands in 2016. 
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4.3 Trading tendency 
As I’ve found proof for the existence of variable transaction costs the question arises if this has 
influenced firms in partaking in the EU ETS market. Therefore I test hypothesis 2: the higher the 
transaction costs per tCO2, the lower the trading tendency. In order to do so I will test the effect of 
transaction costs per tCO2 on three variables associated with trading tendency (1. Did you trade?; 2. 
Frequency; 3. Buy/sell).  
 
Did you trade? 
Transaction costs/tCO2 
N M  SD 
Yes 17 €1.08 1.21 
No 20 €0.70 0.91 
Total 37 €0.92 1.06 
Table 7 – Trading tendency 1 (‘Did you trade?’) vs. Transaction costs per tCO2 (outliers excluded) 
In table 7 the results on the first question, ‘Did your firm trade any EUAs in 2016’, are illustrated, 
accompanied by the mean transaction costs per tCO2 for both answers. As we can see, about half of 
the sample did not trade EUAs. However, in contrast to hypothesis 2 the transaction costs per tCO2 
are actually slightly higher for firms which traded EUAs (EUR 1.08) than those who did not trade (EUR 
0.70). To test the statistical significance of the relationship between transaction costs per tCO2 and 
trading tendency (1. Did you trade?) I used a logistic regression. The predicting power of transaction 
costs per tCO2 was found not to be significant, R2 = 0.045,= -0.365, p = 0.277. Based on these 
results I can therefore already reject hypothesis 2. 
This conclusion is further supported by the other two variables associated with trading tendency (2: 
Frequency and 3: Buy/sell). The results of trading tendency (2: Frequency) are illustrated in table 8, 
again accompanied by the mean transaction costs per tCO2 for each category.  
Frequency 
Transaction costs/tCO2 
S M SD 
Annually 8 €1.33 1.30 
Semi-annually 6 €0.83 0.73 
Quarterly 1 €3.74 - 
Weekly 0 - - 
Ad hoc (specify) 3 €0.15 0.101 
Total 17 €1.09 1.21 
Table 8 – Trading tendency 2 (‘Frequency’) vs. Transaction costs per tCO2 (outliers excluded) 
In the table we find that most firms only traded once (8) or twice (6) in 2016. The remaining 
respondents traded quarterly (1) or ad hoc (3). Those who answered ad hoc specified their answer by 
‘8 times’, ‘whenever required’, ‘to buy the needed quantity’. Based on the mean transaction costs 
per tCO2 a slight decrease in transaction costs can be found as firms traded more often (e.g. annually 
EUR 1.33, ad hoc ‘8 times’ EUR 0.22). However, these results are not consistent as e.g. the firm which 
traded quarterly experienced EUR 3.74 per tCO2. Consequently, using a Spearman Rank-Order 
Correlation again no statistically significant relationship was found between trading tendency (2. 
Frequency) and transaction costs per tCO2 rs = -0.402, p = 0.110.  
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Lastly, table 9 shows the results on the question ‘How would you characterize the trading activities of 
your firm in the EU ETS?’ (3. Sell/buy) and the mean transaction costs per tCO2.  
Sell/buy 
Transaction 
costs/tCO2  
N M SD 
Only selling 1 €0.08 - 
Both selling and buying 1 €2.66 - 
Predominantly buying 1 €3.74 - 
Only buying 14 €0.86 0.97 
Total 17 €1.09 1.21 
Table 9 – Trading tendency 3 (‘Sell/buy’) vs. Transaction costs per tCO2 (outliers excluded) 
Strikingly, almost all respondents only bought EUAs (14). Two of the three respondents which did sell 
EUAs have relative high transaction costs per tCO2 contradicting hypothesis 2. Contrary, the 
respondent that only sold EUAs does have very low transaction costs per tCO2 (EUR 0.08). Still, due 
to the small N the relationship between transaction costs per tCO2 and trading tendency (3: Sell/buy) 
is not statistically significant in a Spearman Rank-Order Correlation, rs = -0.085, p = 0.774.  
Based on these three tests of the effect of transaction costs per tCO2 on trading tendency I can 
conclude that an increase in transaction costs per tCO2 does not lead to a lower trading tendency.   
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4.4 Categories of transaction costs 
As it has become apparent that variable transaction costs exists, the question arises what explains 
these costs. In this section I will test the hypotheses 3 and 4 on the MRV- and trading costs.  
 
Monitoring, reporting and verification costs (MRV) 
Effect of knowledge  
In chapter 2.6 we set hypothesis 3: the higher the knowledge of costs of reducing CO2 emissions, the 
lower the perceived transaction costs of monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Based on the 
theory by Jaraité, Convery and Di Maria (2011, 197) and Frasch (2009, 50) firms are expected to have 
‘learned-by-doing’, which should result in a decrease in MRV-costs. In order to test this hypothesis 
respondents were asked the question ‘Are you familiar with your abatement costs?’ (Q13). By using a 
Kruskal-Wallis H test and an one-way ANOVA I respectively compared the knowledge of abatement 
costs with the evaluation of MRV costs (scale of 1 – ‘very high’ to 5 – ‘very low’) and with the money 
spent on MRV per tCO2. The results of the effect of knowledge on MRV evaluation are illustrated in 
table 10 below. 
 
Knowledge 
MRV  
evaluation (1-5)  
MRV  
transaction costs/tCO2  
N M SD N M SD 
Yes 14 2.71 0.914 14 €0.54 0.68 
More or less 17 2.88 0.600 16 €0.64 0.66 
No 8 3.38 0.916 7 €0.42 0.54 
Total 39 2.92 0.807 37 €0.56 0.64 
Table 10 – Knowledge vs. MRV evaluation (outliers included) and MRV transaction costs per tCO2 (outliers 
excluded) 
As table 10 shows, the majority is ‘more or less’ (17) or fully aware (14) of their costs of reducing CO2 
emissions. A remaining 8 firms answered ‘no’ and are unaware of their firm’s cost of reducing CO2. 
However, in contrast to hypothesis 3 firms which are unfamiliar with their abatement costs 
considered their MRV costs to be slightly lower (3.38, 5 = very low) than those who are familiar with 
their abatement costs (2.71/5). This effect can be partially explained by the effect of knowledge on 
transaction costs per tCO2 spent on MRV. Firms which are (more or less) familiar with their 
abatement costs actually spent slightly more (‘Yes’: EUR 0.54/tCO2, ‘More or less’: EUR 0.64/tCO2) 
on MRV than those who are unfamiliar (‘No’: EUR 0.38/tCO2). Therefore, in contrast to hypothesis 3 
rather than knowledge positively influencing MRV transaction costs, firms still seem to have to 
actively invest in MRV in order to be familiar with their abatement costs.  
However, both relationships are not statistically significant (Knowledge-MRV evaluation: X2(2) = 
2.748, p = 0.253; Knowledge-MRV transaction costs/tCO2: F(2, 36) = 1.818, p = 0.607). Nevertheless 
we can reject hypothesis 3 as I have not found knowledge leading to lower MRV costs.   
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Trading costs 
Due to the design changes in phase 3, auctioning has become the default method for allocation of 
EUAs, and the amount of allowances freely allocated have been lowered. Therefore an “increasing 
number of firms, including small emitters, will have to purchase permits on the market, which will 
likely lead to increasing costs for transacting over time” (Heindl 2011, 3). However, due to differences 
in inhouse capacity and use of intermediaries I set hypothesis 4: the larger the firm, the lower the 
perceived transaction costs of trading. Again, both definitions of firm size (number of emissions and 
number of employees) will be used. 
Direct vs. indirect trading 
As I expect trading costs to be influenced due to differences in inhouse capacity and use of 
intermediaries, analysis of trading methods provided a first indication of the effect of firm size. Of the 
19 firms which traded, 7 which traded directly emitted 96,089 tCO2 (SD = 111,218), whilst the 12 
which traded indirectly emitted 54,775 tCO2 (SD = 69.197). The answers on the question why firms 
chose for trading directly or indirectly partially confirmed the effect of firm size. For example, two 
large firms both in size of employees and in emissions (>100K tCO2) specified their answer and told 
that they had “inhouse competency” or “a corporate netting system” which managed trading 
activity. The firm with the inhouse competency therefore found the transaction costs for trading to 
be “very low”. Contrary, two small firms (in terms of tCO2) chose direct trading as the trading volume 
was too small to trade via a third party and considered trading costs to be moderate. The remaining 
three firms answered that is was cheaper than trading indirectly, and also evaluated trading costs as 
moderate. Contrary, of firms trading indirectly five relative small firms (in terms of tCO2) said that 
there was no inhouse capacity to trade directly. Similarly, three (small) firms (both in size of 
employees as in tCO2) explicitly mentioned their lack of inhouse capacity: “trading is no core 
business”, third party trading is “easier to trade” and “traders are closer the market”. Lastly, three 
(overall) small firms answered that it was quicker than trading directly.  
Firm size vs. trading transaction costs 
As trading costs are variable by default, I can merely test the effect of firm size in number of 
employees and number of emissions on the evaluation of trading (scale of 1 – ‘very high’ to 5 – ‘very 
low’). Table 11 illustrates the effects of firm size by providing the mean of evaluation per category of 
firm in size of employees.  
 
Trading  
evaluation (1-5)  
Firm size N M SD 
Small (<49 employees) 6 3.17 0.75 
Medium-sized (50-259 employees) 12 3.42 0.79 
Large (250> employees) 9 3.11 0.60 
Total 27 3.32 0.71 
Table 11 – Firm size in employees vs. Trading evaluation (outliers included) 
In contrast to hypothesis 4, the evaluation of trading costs barely differences as all three categories 
of firm in terms of size in employees evaluate trading costs to be moderate to low (3.17-3.42). 
Consequently, a Kruskal-Wallis H test found no statistically significant relationship between firm size 
in terms of employees and evaluation of trading costs either, X2(2) = 0.901, p = 0.637. In contrast, 
firm size in terms of emissions does seem to impact trading costs. In table 12, the mean of firm size in 
emissions is illustrated per scale of evaluation of trading costs.   
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Evaluation 
Firm size emissions  
N M SD 
Very high 0 - - 
High 3 64,234 67,834 
Moderate 15 50,347 66,151 
Low 8 118,404 114,460 
Very low 1 113,958 - 
Total 27 74,411 100,674 
Table 12 – Evaluation of trading costs vs. Firm size in emissions (outliers included) 
Strikingly, firms which considered trading costs to be low or very low are almost twice the size in 
terms of emissions in comparison to firms which considered trading costs to be high or moderate. 
Nevertheless, a Spearman Rank-Order Correlation does not find a significant relationship between 
firm size in emissions and evaluation of trading costs, rs = 0.248, p = 0.213. 
Based on the lack of a statistically significant relationship between firm size (employees and tCO2) 
and evaluation of trading transaction costs per tCO2 I therefore reject hypothesis 4. Despite not 
finding a statistically significant relationship between (evaluation of) trading costs and firm size, the 
reasons mentioned by firms to choose for direct or indirect trading tell us that differences in inhouse 
knowledge, capacity and time and costs associated with trading do exist. However, these have not 
yet led to significant differences in trading costs.  
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4.5 Delegation theory  
As I found variable transaction costs, but no relationship with trading tendency in the Netherlands, 
the question remains what guides the EU ETS strategy of firms. Based on the ‘delegation theory’ by 
Lopez, Engels and Knoll (2016, 12) I test the structural effect of transaction costs and hypothesis 5: 
the more coupled the department responsible for the EU ETS, the lower the trading tendency. As 
executive boards of firms were confronted with the EU ETS, uncertainties and resulting transaction 
costs, firms are expected to have innovated their organization and structurally delegated 
responsibility. Due to the nature of knowledge within these departments EU ETS strategy may 
therefore have remained the same, despite regulatory and market incentives which should otherwise 
have affected EU ETS strategy, e.g. lower EUA prices or technological possibilities for cheap CO2 
abatement. 
In order to test hypothesis 5 I asked respondents the question which unit was responsible for the EU 
ETS decision making in 2016. Hereafter this variable was recoded into the variable distance to the 
board, ranging from -2 to +2, from being strongly coupled towards strongly decoupled. In table 13, an 
overview can be found of the frequency of units responsible.  
Department Distance to board N Percentage 
Manufacturing -2.0 3 7.7% 
Legal department -1.0 1 2.6% 
Controlling -1.0 11 28.2% 
Executive board/board of directors 0.0 15 38.5% 
Environmental department 1.0 4 10.3% 
Portfolio-management 2.0 2 5.1% 
Specialized trading floor 2.0 1 2.6% 
Trading outsourced to third parties 2.0 2 5.1% 
Total 39 100% 
Table 13 – Frequency table of units responsible for the EU ETS in 2016 
In order to study hypothesis 4 and therefore the relationship between distance to the board and 
trading tendency (1: Did you trade?) I used a Chi-Square (Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact) test and 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests (2: Frequency, 3: Sell/buy). In table 14 the means of each variable provide a 
first indication of trading tendency.  
  
Table 14 – Distance to board vs. trading tendency 1, 3 and 2. 
Distance 
to board 
Did you trade? 
(1=yes; 2=no) 
Sell/buy? 
(1-5) 
 
Frequency 
Distance  
to board 
N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Coupled -2.0 3 1.67 0.58 1 5.00 -  Ad hoc 3 -0.67 1.15 
 -1.0 12 1.58 0.52 5 5.00 0.00  Weekly 1 2.00 - 
 0.0 15 1.53 0.52 7 4.00 1.53  Quarterly 1 0.00 - 
 1.0 4 1.50 0.58 2 5.00 0.00  Semi-annually 6 -0.17 0.98 
Decoupled 2.0 5 1.20 0.45 4 4.50 1.00  Annually 8 0.50 1.31 
Total  39 1.51 0.51 19 4.53 1.07  Total 19 0.16 1.21 
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In reviewing the results it strikes that the distance to the board of the majority of the respondents 
remained minimal at 0.0 (15 respondents) or -1.0 (slightly coupled; 12 respondents). As the amount 
of firms traded is low too, this restricts us in finding significant results. Nevertheless, in testing 
trading tendency 1 (Sell/buy) it seems that as firms become more decoupled they were in fact more 
likely to trade (1.20 vs. 1.67). However, the results of the Chi-Square (Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact) 
test show that this effect is not significant (N = 39, p = 0.679). Similarly, no clear effect can be found 
of distance to the board to both trading tendency 2 (Frequency) and trading tendency 3 (Sell/buy). 
This is confirmed as the results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests are not significant either (2: X2(4) = 5.965, p = 
0.202; 3: X2(4) = 3.692, p = 0.449). Therefore I reject hypothesis 5 as there is no significant 
relationship between distance to the board and trading tendency.  
As trading tendency is just one aspect of the delegation theory, table 15 also provides an indication 
of the means of knowledge (‘yes’; ’more or less’; ‘no’), investments in technological innovation (‘yes’; 
’no’) and size in terms of employees (‘small’; ‘medium’’; ‘large’). This might provide significant results 
proving that the distance to the board does in fact affect strategy formulation. 
 
Knowledge  
(1=yes; 2=more 
or less; 3=no) 
Technological innovation 
(1=yes; 2=no) 
Size (employees)  
(1=small; 2=medium; 
3=large) 
Distance 
to board 
N M SD M SD M SD 
Coupled -2.0 3 1.33 0.58 1.00 0.00 2.33 0.58 
 -1.0 12 2.17 0.58 1.42 0.52 2.17 0.72 
 0.0 15 1.80 0.86 1.13 0.35 2.07 0.88 
 1.0 4 1.50 0.58 1.50 0.58 2.00 0.00 
Decoupled 2.0 5 1.80 0.84 1.00 0.00 2.80 0.45 
Total  39 1.85 0.75 1.23 0.43 2.21 0.73 
Table 15 – Distance to the board vs. Knowledge, Technological innovation and Size of firms in employees 
However, the descriptive statistics in table 15 show inconsistent results for all three indicators. 
Consequently, the results of a Chi-Square (Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact) test confirm that there is no 
significant relationship between distance to the board technological innovation (N = 39, p = 0.143). 
Similarly, Kruskal-Wallis H tests for distance to the board and knowledge and size in employees aren’t 
significant either (knowledge: X2(4) = 6.692, p = 0.153; size employees: X2(4) = 4.723, p = 0.317). 
This adds to my conclusion in rejecting hypothesis 5, as the underlying delegation theory does not 
seem to stand ground in the sample. 
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5. Conclusion & Discussion 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis I posed the question: ‘What is the effect of the size of firms on transaction costs of the 
EU ETS and trading tendency in the Netherlands in 2016?’. Out of the five hypotheses tested, only 
hypothesis 1 was confirmed as a significant exponential decrease in transaction costs per ton of CO2 
emitted was found as firms increased in size in terms of total verified emissions. Therefore smaller 
firms in terms of total verified emissions experienced a significant higher burden per ton of CO2 
emitted than larger firms. This confirms the existence of variable transaction costs in the EU ETS in 
the Netherlands. In hypothesis 2 I expected trading tendency to decrease as transaction costs per ton 
of CO2 emitted increased. However, no such relationship was found.  
To understand what has led to the transaction costs in the Netherlands I analyzed categories of 
transaction costs by Heindl (2012). Here I learned that the transaction costs of monitoring, reporting 
and verification (MRV) were the greatest contributor to the total transaction costs at 68.7 percent. In 
hypothesis 3 I expected experienced costs of MRV to decrease as firms would have ‘learned by 
doing’. However, no statistically significant relationship was found between the knowledge of firms 
of their costs of reducing CO2 emissions, and the amount of MRV costs perceived. In contrast, firms 
with knowledge of CO2 reduction costs experienced slightly higher MRV costs. In hypothesis 4 I 
expected larger firms to experience lower transaction costs of trading due to differences in inhouse 
capabilities. Despite finding signs of differences in inhouse capabilities, no significant relationship 
between firm size (in emissions or employees) and experienced trading costs was found.  
Lastly, in hypothesis 5 I expected the department responsible for the EU ETS to influence the trading 
tendency. Based on the delegation theory firms were expected to have delegated responsibility of 
the EU ETS to a department early on setting a long-term strategy, which would remain unaffected by 
design changes and transaction costs. However, in testing the distance to the board no significant 
relationship was found between department responsible and trading tendency either.  
Consequently, I can answer my research question as follows. During 2016 in the Netherlands, an 
increase in firm size in terms of total verified emissions led to a decrease in transaction costs per ton 
of CO2 emitted. This has however not affected trading tendency. 
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5.2 Discussion 
To a certain extent these findings are in contrast with my expectations. In the introduction and 
theoretical framework of this thesis we learned that the system of cap and trade is considered the 
most cost-efficient form of economic regulation to reduce emissions of GHG emissions. Due to the 
complexity of the system a solid institutional design was found crucial to ensure success. However, in 
evaluating the institutional design and design changes in the first three phases of the EU ETS it was 
concluded that the EU ETS failed to prevent a dozen of setbacks. Through overallocation of EUAs and 
incomplete information, monitoring and trading structures the prices of EUAs remained low and 
volatile. Based on the theory of transaction costs it was concluded that these uncertainties could 
have obstructed firms in creating a EU ETS strategy and partake in the EU ETS market, resulting in 
welfare losses. In reviewing literature these concerns were confirmed, since due to the heterogeneity 
of EU ETS participants variable transaction costs had disproportionately burdened smaller 
participants in the first phase of the EU ETS. As continued existence of variable transaction costs 
would impede the development of a liquid market, and literature studying the existence of variable 
transaction costs in the Netherlands did not yet exist, transaction costs and trading tendency of 
market participants in the Netherlands in 2016 formed the basis of this research.  
In this study it became evident that firms in the Netherlands still experience multiple uncertainties 
which result in transaction costs. Moreover, in comparing by firm size in total verified emissions the 
existence of variable transaction costs was confirmed. Nevertheless, my hypotheses predicting the 
nature and effect of transaction costs were all rejected. In order to interpret and discuss these results 
I contacted three branch organizations representing the majority of respondents in the sample. By 
combining my conclusions with the experiences of the branch organizations I will formulate two 
policy recommendations. 
Policy recommendations 
The main finding in this study is that due to the existence of variable transaction costs in the 
Netherlands in 2016, smaller firms in terms of total verified emissions were disproportionately 
burdened. However, in evaluation of the height of transaction costs and effect on trading tendency I 
did not find significant results of firms experiencing this inequity. In discussing these results with 
branch organizations they concluded that due to the growing economy and decreasing amount of 
freely allocated EUAs most of the firms were only obliged to buy EUAs for the first time in 2016. Until 
2016, the amount of EUAs banked after the economic crisis or freely allocated were found sufficient 
to comply to the EU ETS. Therefore compliance to the EU ETS in 2016 could still have been reached 
with minimal (strategic) effort and without having to actively participate in trading. Consequently, 
branch organizations concluded that until now EU ETS strategy of firms have not yet been affected by 
economic incentives or abatement costs. Rather, they anticipated future EU ETS developments and 
the certainty of an increasing regulatory burden confirming the theory by Rogge (2016, 13). 
This might explain the striking result of the number of firms (30/39) which had invested in 
technological solutions to reduce CO2 emissions in 2016 despite EUA prices remaining low. Branch 
organizations acknowledged that the burden of the EU ETS has remained low. However, their 
members expect the burden to increase in the following decade, and are anticipating by investing in 
technological innovation. Nevertheless, the effect of the policy-mix with national policy such as the 
‘Energieakkoord’ (SER 2013) was mentioned as well in stimulating innovation. Moreover, one branch 
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organization mentioned that awareness grew as CEOs became younger, leading to firms adjusting 
their strategy and choosing to invest in CO2 abatement for the benefit of their own children’s future.  
Hence, it seems that until now rather than the economic incentives and burden of the EU ETS, the 
mere existence of a regulatory system, outlook of an increasing burden and environmental 
awareness is inducing firms in reaching the goals of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, branch 
organizations do name the negative effects of EU ETS uncertainties and associated transaction costs. 
However, one branch organization considered the variable transaction costs a “necessary evil”. 
Another branch organization fatalistically concluded that their sector has accepted the fact that 
other sectors with larger firms have lower costs per tCO2, adding that “we compete with firms within 
our sector, not with other sectors”. Still, transaction costs may result in welfare losses on society. 
Moreover, one branch organization admitted that “uncertainties of the EU ETS limits some firms in 
making long-term investments”. This underlines the importance of reducing uncertainties and 
transaction costs, bringing us to my policy recommendations. 
Simplify MRV 
The first policy recommendation I make is based on the transaction costs of MRV which are found to 
still be the highest burden for participating firms, and to be evaluated as such accordingly. The 
branch organizations confirm the burden of MRV and state that despite an increase in experience in 
how to monitor, report and verify emissions, the process remains complex due to the amount of 
benchmarks and their required level of detail. Moreover, branch organizations mention how in the 
manufacturing sectors the complexity of monitoring emissions is greater than in the utility industry, 
confirming Matisoff’s theory of the heterogeneous complexity of industries (2010, 4). As I found MRV 
costs to be the greatest contributor to the inequity in total transaction costs, minimalizing the 
administrative complexity might therefore tackle the majority of the variable transaction costs.  
Ensure trading capabilities 
The second policy recommendation is based on the evaluation of the costs of trading EUAs. Due to a 
decrease in free allocation it was expected that firms would start trading and experience lower 
trading costs as they increased in size. This would be explained by the inhouse capacity of firms 
reducing trading costs. However, trading costs appeared to remain equal despite variation in firm 
size. Nevertheless, the signs found of smaller firms lacking inhouse capacity to trade and evaluating 
the costs of trading to be higher are confirmed by one branch organization. However, in discussing 
the trading tendency with branch organizations I learned that due to the growing economy most of 
the firms were only obliged to buy EUAs for the first time in 2016. Until 2016, the amount of EUAs 
banked after the economic crisis was found sufficient to comply to the EU ETS. Therefore the low 
costs of trading can be explained as compliance to the EU ETS in 2016 could still have been reached 
with minimal (strategic) effort. Moreover, trading costs which did occur may have remained low as 
branch organizations mentioned that the amount of EUAs which was traded in 2016 was minimal as 
well.  
However, as signs of differences in trading capabilities are confirmed and trading activity is expected 
to continue to grow in 2017, trading costs may increase and will disproportionately affect smaller 
firms. It is therefore important to anticipate differences in trading capabilities and prevent this from 
impeding market access. My second policy recommendation therefore is to ensure market access by 
addressing trading capabilities of smaller firms.  
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Further research  
The results of this study and policy recommendations provide food for thought for both the NEa in 
monitoring firms, and the AFM in implementing the MiFID II. However, in using my results, 
conclusions and policy recommendations it is important to take in consideration the limitations of 
this study. In this section I will highlight some limitations (from section 3.4) in this study as basis for 
recommendations for future research.  
First and foremost the limited scope of this sample should be acknowledged. The aim of this study 
was to identify and evaluate the nature and effect of variable transaction costs and possible effects 
on trading tendency in a country where current research is limited. Despite reaching a relative large 
N of 39, this still remains a limited number for quantitative research. Nevertheless, this sample 
provided sufficient information in testing the hypotheses and significant results. However, in order to 
increase validity and the worth of the policy recommendations for the AFM and NEa I advise to 
reproduce this study on a broader level encompassing all sectors and at least double the amount of 
respondents. As I found a broad willingness for firms to participate and enhance the functioning of 
the EU ETS, merely sufficient time and manpower seems to be needed to reach a bigger N. 
Second, the ambiguity of measuring transaction costs and its effects limits this study. Literature on 
transaction costs, environmental innovation and trading tendency was found to be scarce and 
heterogeneous in methodology and definitions. For example, in literature (reviews) on transaction 
costs two definitions of firm size were used, as well as multiple definitions of ‘small’, ‘medium’ or 
‘large’. Similarly, a dozen of definitions exist for transaction costs in the EU ETS. The multitude of 
definitions not only complicated operationalization of the variables, but may have also confused 
respondents in answering questions in the survey. This, whereas survey results are already by nature 
limited due to the preset amount of questions, multiple choice answers and the knowledge of the 
respondent. In this study the measurement of transaction costs is mainly based on the estimation of 
costs by the respondent. A more thorough approach where actual budgetary information is used in 
calculating transaction costs would enhance the validity of results in measuring transaction costs. 
Moreover, in order to increase understanding of the results of this study I contacted several branch 
organizations to discuss my conclusions. However, due to constraints of time I have not been able to 
interview all respondents who indicated willingness to elaborate on their EU ETS experience. In order 
to enhance the understanding of e.g. the experienced complexity of the MRV process and the 
capabilities of (smaller) firms to trade I therefore recommend additional in-depth analysis through 
interviews.  
Lastly, in this study I merely focused on the effect of (variable) transaction costs on firm-level, 
evaluating trading tendency. These were found to be not (yet) of significant influence. However, it is 
very likely that through internalizing externalities transaction costs have been passed on to the 
consumer through the final product price. If further research underline my conclusions, hereafter it 
could be analyzed to what extent transaction costs in various sectors have burdened consumers 
leading to a welfare loss.  
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Appendix 
A. Respondents 
Sector 
The survey was filled in by a total of 39 firms in the Netherlands. Of the 39 firms, 35 are in a 
manufacturing sector. The remaining 4 respondents are in ‘the extraction of crude petroleum and 
natural gas’ (NACE 11), ‘electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply’ (NACE 40) and ‘supporting and 
auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies’ (NACE 63). The 35 manufacturers can be 
further specified by their specialization. Ten of the 35 participating manufacturers fabricate ‘other 
non-metallic mineral products’ (NACE 26). Examples of these products are bricks, asphalt, 
semiconductors, soil fertilizer, roof tiles and isolation and construction materials. Seven of the 35 
manufacturers fabricate ‘food products and beverages’ (NACE 15), such as cooking oils and soft 
drinks. This study includes seven manufacturers of ‘pulp, paper and paper products’ (NACE 21). The 
remainder of the respondents manufacture ‘chemicals and/or chemical products’ (5; NACE 24), 
‘rubber and plastic products’ (3; NACE 25), textiles (1; NACE 17), basic metals (1; NACE 27) and 
‘motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers’ (1; NACE 35).  
 
Sector (NACE) Frequency Percentage 
11 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural 
gas 
2 5,1% 
40 - Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 1 2,6% 
63 - Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies 
1 2,6% 
26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products 
10 25,6% 
15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages 7 17,9% 
21 - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products 
7 17,9% 
24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 
5 12,8% 
25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3 7,7% 
17 - Manufacture of textiles 1 2,6% 
27 - Manufacture of basic metals 1 2,6% 
35 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
1 2,6% 
Table 16 – Frequency of sectors (NACE) in sample 
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B. Questionnaire 
 
Evaluation EU ETS in the Netherlands 
Q1 What is your position within your firm? 
Q2 What is the name of your firm? 
Q3 What is the size of your firm? 
 Small firm (up to 49 employees) (1) 
 Medium-sized firm (50-249 employees) (2) 
 Large firm (250 and more employees) (3) 
 
Definition: Installation, according to the EU ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 October 2003, ‘…means a stationary technical unit where one or more 
activities listed in Annex I are carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a 
technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on 
emissions and pollution.’ 
Q8 How many installation will you be referring to? 
 1 (1) 
 2 (2) 
 3 (3) 
 Other: (4) ____________________ 
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Q9 Please identify the industry that covers the activities of your firm using the NACE classification: 
 11 – Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gass (1) 
 15 – Manufacture of food products and beverages (2) 
 17 – Manufacture of textiles (3) 
 20 – Manufacture of wood and or products of wood and cork (4) 
 21 – Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products (5) 
 23 – Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (6) 
 24 – Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (7) 
 25 – Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (8) 
 26 – Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (9) 
 27 – Manufacture of basic metals (10) 
 28 – Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (11) 
 29 – Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (12) 
 25 – Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (13) 
 26 – Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (14) 
 27 – Manufacture of basic metals (15) 
 28 – Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (16) 
 29 – Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (17) 
 30 – Manufacture of office machinery and computers (18) 
 31 – Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (19) 
 32 – Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus (20) 
 34 – Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (21) 
 35 – Manufacture of other transport equipment (22) 
 40 – Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply (23) 
 60 – Land transport; transport via pipelines (24) 
 63 – Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies (25) 
 75 – Public administration and defence; compulsory social security (26) 
 80 – Education (27) 
 85 – Health and social work (28) 
 90 – Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities (29) 
 
Definition: Transaction costs are the costs your firm incurred by (a) preparing for and setting up 
systems to implement EU ETS, and (b) participating in the market since 2005. Transaction costs may 
be incurred when organisational structures on (inter)national level or within your firm are not yet 
'complete'. Currently, we are in Phase 3 (2013-2020) of the EU ETS. Transaction costs today can be 
grouped into four categories: 1) Monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) costs2) Trading costs3) 
Informational costs; and,4) Application for free allocation costs 
Definition: Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) costs are all annual costs in measuring CO2 
output, creating benchmarks, writing emission reports and verifying results at national authorities to 
ensure compliance with the EU ETS 
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Q10 How frequently have you monitored your firm's CO2 emissions in 2016? 
 Daily (1) 
 Weekly (2) 
 Monthly (3) 
 Quarterly (4) 
 Semi-annually (5) 
 Annually (6) 
 Ad hoc (please specify) (7) ____________________ 
 
Q11 In 2016, how did your firm perceive the transaction costs for monitoring, reporting & 
verification? 
 Very high (1) 
 High (2) 
 Moderate (3) 
 Low (4) 
 Very low (5) 
 
Q12 Please provide a breakdown of your firm’s total monitoring, reporting & verification costs in 
2016. (Must total 100%) 
______ Monitoring % (1) 
______ Reporting % (2) 
______ Verification % (3) 
Definition: Informational costs are all costs of searching for information and comparing technologies 
for CO2 reduction. Informational costs include costs of understanding and creating EU ETS strategy in 
accounting for uncertainties in related costs and results. 
Q13 Are you familiar with your firm's costs of reducing CO2 emissions? 
 Yes (1) 
 More or less (2) 
 No (3) 
 
Q14 In 2016, how did your firm perceive the costs of collecting information and comparing 
technology/uncertainties in related costs and results? 
 Very high (1) 
 High (2) 
 Moderate (3) 
 Low (4) 
 Very low (5) 
 
Definition: Free allocation costs are all costs involved in applying for free allocation of allowances at 
national authorities.  
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Q15 In 2016, how did your firm perceive the transaction costs for application for free allocation? 
 Very high (1) 
 High (2) 
 Moderate (3) 
 Low (4) 
 Very low (5) 
 
Definition: ‘EUA’ is the European Union CO2 emissions allowance. An allowance, according to the EU 
ETS Directive (2003/87/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003, 
‘…means an allowance to emit one Tonne of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent during a specified period, 
which shall be valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this Directive and shall be 
transferable in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.’  
Q16 Did your firm trade any EUAs in 2016? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q24 Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q17 
 
Q17 How would you characterize the trading activities of your firm in the EU ETS? 
 Only selling (1) 
 Predominantly selling (2) 
 Both selling and buying (3) 
 Predominantly buying (4) 
 Only buying (5) 
 
Q18 How often did your firm trade? 
 Daily (1) 
 Weekly (2) 
 Monthly (3) 
 Quarterly (4) 
 Semi-annually (5) 
 Annually (6) 
 Ad hoc (please specify) (7) ____________________ 
 
Q19 Has your firm held an excess of allowances in 2016?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 Do not want to answer (3) 
 What percentage? (4) ____________________ 
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Q20 How did your firm trade? 
 Directly, without a third party (1) 
 Indirectly, via a third party (2) 
Condition: Indirectly, via a third par... Is Selected. Skip To: Q22 Condition: Directly, without a third p... 
Is Selected. Skip To: Q21 
 
Q21 What were the main reasons for trading directly? (tick all that apply) 
 It was cheaper than trading via a third party (1) 
 Wanted to learn how to trade (2) 
 Trade volume was too small via a third party (3) 
 Other (please specify) (4) ____________________ 
Condition: Skip to Q25 
 
Q22 What were the main reasons for trading via a third party? (tick all that apply) 
 It was cheaper than trading directly (1) 
 It was quicker than trading directly (2) 
 There was no in-house capacity to trade directly (3) 
 Other (please specify) (4) ____________________ 
 
Q23 What intermediary services did your firm use to facilitate the trade of EUAs? (tick all that apply) 
 Financial institutions (such as a bank) (1) 
 Specialised carbon trading brokerages (2) 
 Exchange (3) 
 Other (please specify) (4) ____________________ 
 
Q24 What were the main reasons for not trading? (tick all that apply) 
 Met the CO2 obligation without buying EUA (1) 
 Met the CO2 obligation without selling EUA (2) 
 CO2 abatement was cheaper than buying EUA (3) 
 Other (please specify) (4) ____________________ 
 
Definition: Trading costs are all costs made in making a trade of EUAs. 
Q25 How did your firm perceive the overall transaction costs of trading in 2016? 
 Very high (1) 
 High (2) 
 Moderate (3) 
 Low (4) 
 Very low (5) 
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Q26 In 2016, which unit in your firm was responsible for the decision making on emissions trading? 
 Executive board/board of directors (1) 
 Environmental department (2) 
 Legal department (3) 
 Controlling (4) 
 Risk management (5) 
 Portfolio-management (6) 
 Specialised trading floor (7) 
 Manufacturing (8) 
 No explicit responsibility (9) 
 Trading outsourced to third parties (10) 
 Other (please specify) (11) ____________________ 
 
Q27 In 2016, which units within your firm and which internal organisations provided advice and/or 
support? Multiple answers possible. 
 Communications department (1) 
 Environmental department (2) 
 Legal department (3) 
 Manufacturing (4) 
 Controlling (5) 
 Risk management (6) 
 Portfolio management (7) 
 Specialised trading floor (8) 
 
Q28 Who were responsible for the EU ETS in your firm? (record none as 0) 
 Number of people (1) Percentage of time spent (2) 
General internal staff (1)   
Dedicated EU ETS staff (2)   
 
Q29 What is the estimate of the overall full-time working days spent (an annual average during year 
2016) by your firm’s staff on the EU ETS?(Write in number, record none as 0) 
Q30 How would you divide the total amount of time spent internally on the EU ETS for each 
procedure in percentages? (Must total 100%) 
______ Trading (1) 
______ Application for free allocation costs (2) 
______ Monitoring, reporting & verification costs (3) 
______ Informational costs (4) 
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Q31 In 2016, which external organisations provided advice and/or support? Multiple answers 
possible. 
 Specialised private consulting firms (1) 
 General private consulting firms (2) 
 Banks (3) 
 Insurance companies (4) 
 Industrial associations (5) 
 Environmental NGO’s (6) 
 State services (7) 
 Scientists, research institutions (8) 
 Other emitters involved with emissions trading (9) 
 Workshops (10) 
 No external advice/support (11) 
 Other (12) ____________________ 
Condition: No external advice/support Is Selected. Skip To: Q34 
 
Q32 How would you divide the total amount of money spent externally on the EU ETS for each 
procedure in percentages? (Must total 100%) 
______ Trading (1) 
______ Application for free allocation costs (2) 
______ Monitoring, reporting & verification costs (3) 
______ Informational costs (4) 
Q33 Please provide your firm’s estimated overall external costs (an annual average during 2016 in 
000s of Euro): ___ 
Q34 What aspect of EU ETS compliance was the most costly for your firm? Please rank the following 
activities with 1 being least costly and 4 most costly 
______ Trading costs (1) 
______ Application for free allocation costs (2) 
______ Monitoring, reporting, verification costs (3) 
______ Informational costs (4) 
Q35 How did your firm’s total transaction costs evolve over 2016? 
 They increased (1) 
 They decreased (2) 
 They remained the same (3) 
 
Q36 Please provide below any additional comments which are important to understand the 
transaction costs experienced by your firm: ___ 
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Q37 In 2016, did your firm invest in technological solutions in order to reduce CO2 emissions? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q38 In your opinion, what is the relationship between technological solutions to emissions and 
trading emissions allowances? 
 No relationship (1) 
 They are alternative to each other (2) 
 They are complementary to each other (3) 
 Technological solutions make trading possible in the first place (4) 
 
Q39 Has your firm developed a long-term strategy on emissions trading? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q39 Condition: No Is Selected. Skip To: Q40 
 
Q40 What goals are ultimately guiding this strategy? Multiple answers possible. 
 Balanced emission allowance account (1) 
 Emissions trading as a source of revenue (2) 
 Other (3) 
 
Q41 Where do you currently see the most important uncertainties in emissions trading? Multiple 
answers possible. 
 Strategies of market participants (1) 
 Intransparencies of the process of policy-making (2) 
 Technological innovations (3) 
 Regulatory changes (4) 
 Long-term price development (5) 
 Short-term price volatility (6) 
 Other (please specify) (7) ____________________ 
 
Q42 You have reached the end of the survey. To enhance the quality of this research we would like 
to contact several participants to discuss survey outcomes. Do you allow us to contact you?  
 Yes (1) 
 I'd rather not. (2) 
Condition: Yes Is Selected. Skip To: Q42 Condition: I'd rather not. Is Selected. Skip To: End of Survey. 
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Q43 Name: 
Q44 Telephone number: 
Q45 Email address: 
 
